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GOVERNING SCIENCE: PUBLIC RISKS
AND PRIVATE REMEDIES
BARRY R. FURROWt
Scientific progress has brought innumerable benefits: new sources
of energy, more effective medical care, and most important, a greater
understanding of ourselves and our physical environment. Simultane-
ously, however, science has created hazards both as a by-product of
ongoing research in fields such as biology and as a result of technolo-
gies developed out of scientific research. Contemporary scientific re-
search increasingly presents hazards of uncertain probability and mag-
nitude. These hazards often fall in the gray areas outside of the
jurisdiction of existing government agencies. The nature of the hazards
is not recognized initially except by those directly engaged in the re-
search, and the lack of controls enables a technology to develop before a
preliminary assessment can take place. The ideology of modem science
combines with these institutional deficiencies to create a need for more
effective controls over scientific research.
This article contends that private, rather than public, action can
deal effectively with scientific risks. Private tort litigation can play an
important role as a risk-assessment mechanism in the development of
new technologies if the content of common law entitlements is redefined
and coupled with expanded judicial powers. Common law rules of enti-
tlement, expressed in nuisance law, parallel contemporary perceptions
of scientific and technological hazards, as reflected in much recent fed-
eral legislation.' In a regulatory vacuum, private law offers the only
avenue for regulating certain categories of risks produced by scientific
research. The thesis of this article has three parts: a substantive theory
of entitlements, a procedural model, and an analysis of the social con-
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1 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11977); Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300g-l (1976); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
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text of the risks of scientific research. The theory of entitlements derives
from well established tort concepts of nuisance law; the procedural
model acknowledges and draws upon the burgeoning powers of the ju-
diciary as demonstrated in contexts such as the structural reform of
prisons and other public institutions; and the social analysis evaluates
the newly created risks-of unknown probability and high conse-
quence-generated by modern research.
New risks are generated daily in our industrialized, technological
society: risks associated with toxic substances in the chemical industry,
side-effects of drugs, and unforeseen effects of apparently benign tech-
nologies such as aerosol can propellants. The concept of risk has itself
been expanded by modern science and medicine to include previously
unsuspected categories of hazards such as carcinogenesis (induction of
runaway growth of the cells of some part of the body), mutagenesis
(modification of the body's genetic material), and teratogenesis (altera-
tion of the development of a fetus in utero).2
Risks generated by research activities are in a special category.
Unlike the usual environmental harms, where the damage-creating in-
strumentality is already producing a by-product that poses some level of
long term health impact, harms associated with genetic research, for
example, include problems of feared catastrophe, with uncertainty as
the dominant feature. The problem of uncertainty is intensified because
of the possibility that research into fundamental biological or physical
structures may alter those structures in a way that does not normally
occur in the natural environment. How then is this problem different
from industrial production of toxic chemicals or radioactive by-products
and airborne or waterborne effluent which may have long-term health
effects? The uncertainty of harm may be just as pronounced. Radioac-
tive materials pose unique half-life problems, requiring in some cases
thousands of years to decay to a nonthreatening level. Certain toxic
chemicals likewise may not degrade, or may break down in pernicious
and unpredictable ways. Both radioactive materials and toxic chemicals
may enter the food chain or ecological niches in ways which pose long-
term threats. With either type of hazard, however, the risk is enhanced
because of the sheer volume of the hazardous substances produced as
by-products of large-scale commercial use and production. Production
and use can therefore be reduced, stopped, or altered; the source of the
hazard, being traceable, can be pinpointed, and most important, regula-
' For a general discussion, see W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE
AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 24-29 (1976); MANAGEMENT OF ASSESSED
RISK FOR CARCINOGENS (W. Nicholson ed. 1981); Ames, Identifing Environmental
Chemicals Causing Mutations and Cancer, 204 Sci. 587 (1979).
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tory measures to govern production, shipment, and storage can be im-
plemented by existing government agencies.
Research, such as the biological research that gave rise to the re-
combinant DNA controversy, offers hazards of a different order of
magnitude. The putative risks involve pathogens, altered organisms,
and changed immunological defenses. Harmful organisms can
reproduce and mutate if an adaptive niche is available. The level of
production required for self-sustaining growth may require only a sin-
gle laboratory experiment, in contrast with toxic chemical by-products
linked to commercial levels of production. Attention to research hazards
is therefore best directed to the earliest stages of investigation.
Science is as yet unregulated in any meaningful way by a govern-
ment agency with a specific mandate to protect a client group from
hazards. Agencies which fund research, such as the National Science
Foundation and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), exist to ori-
ent research in the most promising directions and to fund the best of
that research.' These relationships are quite unlike the relationship of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to
workers in industry, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) to manufacturers of consumer goods. In light of scientific self-
regulation, this vacuum is viewed as harmless by some. Given the limits
of self-regulation, however, and the peculiar uncertainties attendant
upon research, a regulatory vacuum is undesirable. Some systematic
means of evaluating risks is necessary.
The goal of any institution which would focus on the hazards of
scientific research would not be to reach scientific truth, nor to resolve a
controversy within a field, but rather to get some sense of the nature
and probability of the risks, to inform the relevant affected public of the
nature of the activity, and to send a message to government deci-
sionmakers. In the area of new hazards, "an explicitly intrusive ap-
proach is required, one that judicial scrutiny can provide."'
3 The mandate of the National Science Foundation is "to initiate and support
basic scientific research and programs and to strengthen scientific research. . . and to
appraise the impact of research upon industrial development and upon the general wel-
fare." Nat'i Sci. Found. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1) (1976).
4 Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Insti-
tutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. Rnv. 489, 541 (1981) (recommending a more intrusive
approach to judicial review of agency decisionmaking). For an interesting analysis of
various opposition movements in America to technologies such as the fluoridation of
water, see Mazur, Opposition to Technological Innovation, 13 MINERvA 58, 81
(1975). For an expanded discussion by Mazur of the fluoridation controversy and other
technological issues, see A. MAZuR, THE DYNAMICS OF TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY
(1982).
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The recombinant DNA controversy offers an excellent case study
for assessing the problems of regulating scientific research. Recombi-
nant DNA research and the bio-technology that has emerged from it
command our attention because of scientific perceptions of the promise
of the technique in uncovering areas of ignorance about human genetic
structure, and the promise of profitable commercial applications.5 It is
a paradigm case, like the development of nuclear research in the 1950's,
for hazards inherent in the research itself, raising questions about the
technique, its directions, and the effectiveness of scientific self-regula-
tion when confronted with risky research.6 Scientific progress and com-
mercial promise have fueled a shortened interval between the initial
stages of an area of research and its first technological applications.
The recombinant DNA controversy highlights the troubling issues in
regulating research. How do we uncover risks early? By what mecha-
nisms? What mix of public regulation and private law can fill the void
now surrounding the hazards of scientific research? A judicial "first
look" doctrine can enhance the process of discovering and analyzing
I Commercial applications of the recombinant DNA technology have burgeoned;
investors have seized upon it as the new technology of the eighties, replacing
microprocessing as the leading scientific investment opportunity. See Drinkhall, Ex-
Convict and Microbiologists Join Forces to Ride the Genetic-Engineering Wave, Wall
St. J., Mar. 4, 1981, at 31, col. 4; Shaping Life In the Lab, TIME, Mar. 9, 1981, at 50.
Larger established chemical and drug companies have either expanded their existing
research or have worked out collaborative arrangements with the new companies cre-
ated to market the products of recombinant DNA technology. See Genentech Reports
Output of Hormone To Spur Cow Growth, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981, at 32, col. 2. It
has been described as "one of the biggest industrial opportunities of the late 20th cen-
tury." Shaping Life In the Lab, supra, at 51. See generally Elia, Commercial Potential
of Genetic Engineering Seems to Be Vast in Coming Decade, Study Says, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 16, 1981, at 37, col. 3. Humulin, a synthetic form of insulin, became the first drug
made from synthetic genetic materials approved for human use by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration. As of November, 1982, Humulin, the first such insulin drug,
was made with a synthetic duplicate of human genes, and licensed by Genentech to Eli
Lilly & Co. for production and sale as a nonprescription drug. Artificial Genes: Biotech
Comes to the Drugstore, TIME, Nov. 15, 1982, at 65.
6 It has been seen by scholars of science and society as "a metaphor grown large
for the general problem of controlling the dangerous products and processes which are
the fruits of modern science." M. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 226 (1979). See
also SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HOUSE
COMMrTTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss. GENEIC ENGI-
NEERING, HUMAN GENETICS, AND CELL BIOLOGY: EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
ISSUES, BIOTECHNOLOGY (Comm. Print 1980); Green, The recombinant DNA contro-
versy: a model of public influence, 34 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 12 (1978). But see
Graham, Concerns about Science and Attempts to Regulate Inquiry, 107 DAEDALUS 1,
13 (1978).
This article focuses on public health risks, broadly defined. The risks of abuse,
such as the use of genetic engineering techniques for biological warfare, are not dis-
cussed. Such concerns are important, but not easily subject to the control mechanisms I
propose. For a discussion of such potential misuses, see Wright & Sinsheimer, Recombi-
nant DNA and Biological Warfare, 39 BULL. ATOM. SCINITS 20 (1983).
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new hazards in an era of overworked, understaffed, and beleagured fed-
eral agencies.7
I. THE PROBLEM OF REGULATING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
A. The Paradigm Case: The Recombinant DNA Controversy
The controversy over genetic research provides a useful case study
of the problems of regulating science, s offering arguments for and
against regulation, diverging viewpoints on risk assessment, and a clari-
fication of values. The discoveries of molecular biology, like the revolu-
tion in quantum physics, have transformed our understanding of the
natural world, allowing scientists to manipulate the genetic code, and
raising hopes that the structure and function of genes in higher orga-
nisms can be understood. 9 Recombinant DNA (rDNA) research in
particular, as part of the revolution in biology, has offered a technology
for producing hormones, antibodies, interferon, antigens in immuniza-
tion, and an efficient means of introducing nitrogen fixation10 in higher
plants. The benefits, both purely scientific and practical, stand in sharp
contrast to the perceived hazards of the research.
The hazards of rDNA research are an integral part of the tech-
nique used. The genetic code that determines the properties of living
organisms is contained in a long helical molecule found in every living
cell."" Biologists have learned how to divide that molecule into seg-
ments, attach segments of one molecule to another, and reimplant this
restructured molecule in a living cell. As a result, one or more of the
properties of the cell from which the new fragment was taken will be
imparted to the host cell. The host cell, commonly Escherichia (E.) Coli
' For a critical view of creating new regulatory agencies in response to perceived
national problems see J. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion (Nov. 12, 1975)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
8 See Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GA. L. REV. 785
(1977) (excellent discussion of alternative regulatory approaches); Comment, Consider-
ations in the Regulation of Biological Research, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1420 (1978).
9NIH describes the technique's impact as "a profound and qualitative change in
the field of genetics." NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTON NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING REcoMBI-
NANT DNA MOLECULES, Pt. 1, at v. (1977) (hereinafter cited as FINAL EIS). For a
more recent perspective, see Lewin, Biggest Challenge Since the Double Helix, 212 ScI.
28 (1981).
10 See Abelson, A Revolution in Biology, 209 ScI. 1319 (1980); Davis, Frontiers of
the Biological Sciences, 209 Sci. 78 (1980). For an excellent history of the develop-
ments in modern molecular biology, see H. HUDSON, THE EIGHTH DAY OF CREA-
TION (1979).
11 See James Watson's first person account in J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX
(1968). For a useful simplified discussion, see R. HUTTON, BIO-REvOLUTION: DNA
AND THE ETHICS OF MAN-MADE LIFE 93-112 (1978).
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bacteria, can replicate itself, including its new genetic code, by division
into two cells which can in turn divide and replicate in a process con-
trolled only by available nutrients.
The risks of recombinant DNA research, described by the Su-
preme Court as "a gruesome parade of horribles,"' take several
forms."3 First, the properties of the recombination cannot be known
completely, and some of these new properties might be dangerous. In
fact, the very purpose of the experiment might be to break down and
recombine a complex molecule in order to determine its properties. Sec-
ond, the host cell for recombinant DNA experiments was one or an-
other strain of E. Coli, strains of which commonly reside in the human
intestine. E. Coli was the vehicle of choice because its native properties
are thoroughly known, making it easier to identify the properties of a
foreign fragment of DNA by observing the changes it produces. 4 The
use of E. Coli as a vehicle for experimentation, however, makes possi-
ble the scenario in which an artificially altered host cell could be widely
disseminated among humans, plants, and animals. A pathogenic bacte-
rium could thus spread quickly after escaping the laboratory setting by
transfering genes to other E. Coli strains. These harmful new strains
could prove uncontrollable by normal antibacterial agents. Third, the
insertion of DNA derived from a different species may change certain
properties of that host. In the words of the NIH Environmental Impact
Statement, "[tihe change may be advantageous, detrimental, or neutral
with regard to (a) the survival of the recipient species, (b) other forms
of life that come in contact with the recipient, and (c) aspects of the
nonliving environment."1 Fourth, a recombinant form of life might be
so foreign that its mere presence in the host system, irrespective of any
pathogenic qualities, could be a health hazard. The host system's regu-
12 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (man-made organism is
patentable; risks of research for legislature to consider, not the Court).
is For a general discussion of the risks, see FINAL EIS, supra note 9.
" The choice of E. Coli as a host for recombinant DNA research is itself a ques-
tionable one, but the quantity of information which had accumulated about its charac-
teristics dictated its use in the eyes of the scientists involved. DeWitt Stetten, NIH
deputy director for science and chairman of the NIH Recombinant DNA Committee,
in a letter of October 6, 1975, wrote to a critic:
You are ... undoubtedly correct [in principle] that E. coli is the wrong
microorganism .... Even at the Asilomar Conference, however, I de-
tected little interest on the part of the majority to table E. coli and begin
again from scratch with some other organism. The enormous quantity of
accumulated information about E. coli appeared to dictate that, despite its
hazards, this was still the organism of first choice.
Letter reprinted in Recombinant DNA: Chimeras Set Free Under Guard, 93 ScL. 215,
215 (1976).
"' FINAL EIS, supra note 9, at v.
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latory or immunity systems for example might be ineffective against the
organism, and the system's metabolic functions would thereby be dis-
rupted. Fifth, changes in the properties of E. Coli might increase its
own ability to survive, perhaps improving its resistance to antibiotics
and drugs. Such resistance is often genetically determined, and natural
events such as the rapid spread of resistance to clinically important
drugs over the last twenty years is evidence of the relative ease of trans-
fer, by naturally occurring DNA recombinations, from one species of
microorganism to another.16
The hazards and benefits of the research have been thoroughly
discussed since it first became a source of controversy in 1973, when the
Gordon conference highlighted the hazards which such research
poses.1" Scientists found themselves in the limelight, exposed to con-
cerns and criticism to which they had thought themselves immune. Yet
a review of the history of regulation suggests that scientists remained in
charge, that public participation was haphazard at best, that institu-
tions for dealing with risky research gave it momentum rather than
slowing it. Little organized opposition arose to the conduct of research
at various academic centers and industrial labs around the country,
with the exception of Cambridge, Massachusetts,18 for reasons related
to the abstruseness of the issue to laymen, even well educated ones, and
the effective lobbying efforts of scientists on the delicacy and potential
benefits of this particular scientific enterprise. The threat was not seen
as sufficiently pressing and tangible to excite significant opposition or
to generate momentum for legislative action. The result was a go-slow
attitude by the federal government toward regulation other than
through NIH guidelines governing federally funded research, applica-
ble to industry only on a voluntary basis. 9 The legislative response to
the controversy was a series of bills, based upon a variety of agency
models, that proposed a licensing/inspection system, governed by a
commission2 ° or by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(now Health and Human Services)21 and with several varying fea-
16 Id.
17 See R. HUTTON, supra note 11, at 44.
18 For a journalistic account, see Wade, Gene-Splicing: At Grass-Roots Level a
Hundred Flowers Bloom, 195 Sci. 558 (1977).
"Following a vote of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAG) of
NIH, the transfer of DNA from one nonpathogenic organism to another was allowed
in a P1 containment facility (reduced from a P3 requirement). See 4 RECOMBiNANT
DNA TECH'L BULL. 30 (1981).
20 See S. 1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Senator Kennedy).
21 See H.R. 6158, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 7418, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
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tures.22 The final outcome was not legislation but rather continued reli-
ance on the NIH guidelines.28
The recombinant DNA controversy highlights central characteris-
tics which other areas of scientific research may possess, and which
must be understood before considering regulatory alternatives. First,
conducting the research creates risks of a sort which only insiders who
are at the forefront of the work would initially spot. Thus, triggering
an early warning system is dependent upon the scientists involved.
Second, financial support, at its inception, comes primarily from
the federal government, leading to a source of control through condi-
tions on funding, and a subsequent problem of how to govern the gov-
ernors, since peer review involves review by those typically already
heavily committed to the field. 5
Third, the research has possible commercial-industrial applica-
tions which promise a rapid deployment of the technology once per-
fected, giving rise to the problem of how to govern industrial research
and its applications. The transition from research to commercial use
has regulatory implications. Where a drug-related product is involved,
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration have ultimate con-
trol over the product's hazards (as opposed to hazards created by the
research itself).2" Where laboratory workers are involved in private in-
22 For a discussion of the political and social history of the controversy, see gener-
ally S. KRIMSKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SocIAL HISTORY OF THE RECOMBINANT
DNA CONTROVERSY (1982). For a detailed look at legislative proposals to regulate
rDNA research, see Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Re-
sponsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1019 (1978). For a detailed examination of the legislation, see Culliton, Recombi-
nant DNA Bills Derailed: Congress Still Trying to Pass a Law, 199 Sci. 274 (1978).
22 Two recent examples of state legislation affecting recombinant DNA research
include N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3220-3223 (McKinney 1982) which requires a
certification procedure for the operation of laboratories engaged in such research, but
bases its regulation upon the NIH Guidelines: "If the National Institutes of Health
guidelines are revised, the commissioner shall revise the regulations for the conduct of
recombinant DNA activity accordingly." Id. § 3223. Thus, if the NIH downgrades its
guidelines, New York will simply follow suit. Since the statute also preempts any local
law or ordinance, it fails to present a significant regulatory alternative. A second exam-
plC is MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. §§ 898-910 (1980). A license is required, and a
Biohazards committee is to be appointed to monitor licensed projects. The NIH Guide-
lines are used again as the baseline for regulation. Sanctions are more elaborate, how-
ever, and the law allows for inspection of premises.
24 See infra note 91.
22 See J. COLE, S. COLE & L. RUBIN, PEER REVIEW IN THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION 12 (1978) (citing report of the Office of Management and Budget).
" See Goldberg & Miller, The Role of the Food and Drug Administration in the
Regulation of the Products of Recombinant DNA Technology, 4 RECOMBINANT DNA
TECH. BULL. 15 (1981). The authority of the Food and Drug Administration to regu-
late basic research, under its statutory mandate to assure the identity, strength, quality
and purity of the products of food and drug research, is questionable. See Korwek, The
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dustry, OSHA has powers over workplace safety. 7 Risks inherent in
the conduct of the research, whether of accident or unforeseen result,
are unregulated.
Given the present lack of federal controls, one is left with indus-
trial self-regulation. Industry spokesmen try to forestall external regu-
lation by contending that they have too much to lose to take chances in
exploiting a new technology,2 a claim which may have some validity
for the giant pharmaceutical companies, but less for the newer finns
created to capitalize on the new technology. 9 Critics of science, like
Ravetz, contend that the incentive structure for good science is weak-
ened in the industrialized setting: good science may not result because
the careers of industrial scientists do not follow the same pattern as
academic scientists. Publication is not as important, quality control is
reduced, and peer pressure outside of the company is minimized. Given
the differences in the norms of science within and outside industry, as
well as in the incentive structures, it can be argued that industrial sci-
ence will tend to be shoddy science, and risks are correspondingly
greater.30 If dangerous work is undertaken within industry, what is the
likelihood of whistleblowing by a scientist involved? Although some
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have offices
responsive to whistleblowing complaints,"1 the individual researcher
still faces severe financial costs and possible damage to his career. He
may be fired, may have substantial out-of-pocket litigation expenses,
and may find himself out of his field.32 This suggests that a mechanism
is needed which will provide a chance to evaluate the risks of the re-
search before acceleration of the work into commercial settings occurs, a
mechanism to deal with "the diminishing lead time between initial in-
NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Authority of FDA to Require
Compliance with the Guidelines, 35 FooD, DRUG & CosMEncs L.J. 633, 643 (1980).
" A team from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NI-
OSH) has recently inspected the facilities of Cetus Corporation in Berkeley, California,
as a part of a study of the hazards of recombinant DNA technology. 1 GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING LT.=rR 2 (1981).
2 See Industrial Applications of Recombinant DNA Techniques: Hearings on S.
1217 Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1980)
(statements of Mr. Farley and Mr. Turner).
2 G. RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 54-57
(1973).
SO Id.
S, The Office of Public Awareness within the EPA publishes information about
how employees can blow the whistle without risking termination.
U See Chalk, Maintaining Scientific Independence in a Bureaucratic Society, in 2
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 11-21 (F. Sterrett & B. Rosenberg eds. 1982); see also
Holden, Scientist with Unpopular Data Loses Job, 210 Sci. 749 (1980).
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novation and widespread application."3
B. Myths of Autonomy: The Limits of Self-Regulation in Science
A central issue in the recombinant DNA controversy has been the
efficacy of self-regulation in scientific research. If self-governance is ef-
fective, then scientists have a strong claim that their field deserves to be
autonomous, and should remain free from outside regulation. It is diffi-
cult to assess the autonomy of a profession, given the subtle dynamics
by which members establish norms and sanction colleagues. Certain
general observations can be made, however, which suggest that the per-
ceived autonomy of scientific research is largely a myth.
Autonomy is the basic characteristic of a profession. Professions
possess substantial powers of self-control, gained either through profes-
sional associations, which foster group consciousness and integration
while protecting members from outside interference and imposition of
standards," or through informal networks of collegial relationships."3
Typical traits include self-determination of educational standards, laws
affecting the profession shaped by the profession with little lay evalua-
tion and control, and norms of practice often more rigorous than legal
controls.
Science can be viewed as a profession, sharing common features
with law and medicine. These features include a high educational re-
quirement for entry, a monopolistic position regarding the performance
of certain functions, control of admission standards, and authority of
internal bodies over member conduct and subsequent hostility to any
form of lay involvement."6 Science, like other professions, specializes in
the development and application of complex knowledge considered vital
to society's needs. This knowledge has an intellectual or scientific basis
so that the activities of the group are subjected to and modified by theo-
retical analysis. The methods of science are formulated and accepted by
the scientific community; the results of research are measured by crite-
ria that the particular scientific specialty has developed. 7 Science is
thus a "self-defined enterprise, rarely, if ever, subject to external scru-
L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 8 (1975).
" See E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 71-72 (1970).
3' See id. at 1901.
"B See Ben-David, The Profession of Science and its Powers, 10 MINERVA 362
(1972). See generally M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977); Cogan, Toward a Definition of Profession, 23 HARV. EBDUC. REV.
33 (1953); Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY PURE AND APPLIED 186-96 (revised ed. 1945).
37 See G. RAVETZ, supra note 29, at 153-66 (1973).
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tiny.""8 Extended specialized training in the corpus of knowledge of the
profession is typical, and this socializing experience is longer and more
encompassing than that of novitiates in other occupations.3 9
In science there is a system of monetary and psychic rewards sym-
bolic of achievement and therefore ends in themselves.40 Income and
prestige increase as professionalism increases. Like members of other
professions, scientists strongly identify with their field, rarely desiring
to change careers.41 Scientists are not motivated solely by altruism, but
as it is with other professions, the institutional structure of scientific
research has an ideological commitment to serve society. Science, unlike
other professions, lacks a specific clientele to which it is accountable,
and this absence of external checks leaves scientists without guidance
regarding how to respond to either hazards arising out of research or
harmful applications of the research product.
42
Claims to autonomy are based upon three contentions: first, that
the knowledge and skill of the profession's members are special and
laymen cannot evaluate them; second, that professionals are responsible
and work ethically without supervision; and third, that the profession
can be trusted to act if one of its members acts improperly.43
Science can be distinguished from other professions in several
ways. First, while the work of most professionals is defined by the
needs of a particular client, the cause for which a scientist works is
more diffuse. The dominant ideology of science is in fact that the scien-
tist serves only the large goal of scientific truth in his pure research, a
commitment to the value of advancing knowledge." In reality the mo-
tives of the scientist, like those of any professional, are a complex mix-
ture of altruistic and egoistic behavior, with the ultimate goal being the
receipt of recognition of priority of discovery, with its attendant psychic
and career benefits.
Second, in science there is typically only one solution available for
3 Lapp6 & Martin, The Place of the Public in the Conduct of Science, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1978).
39 See Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psy-
chology, Sociology and Medicine, 25 AM. Soc. Rav. 903 (1960).
40 See Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, in THE PROFES-
SIONS IN AMERICA 18 (K. Lynn & Daedulus ed. 1965).
41 See Goode, supra note 39.
42 See Cournand, The Code of the Scientist and Its Relationship to Ethics, 198
Scj. 699 (1977). For an attempt to develop the foundations of an expanded ethic of
scientific responsibility, based on increased predictive powers and historical sensitivity
to the undesirable effects of scientific developments, see Twiss, The Problem of Moral
Responsibility in Medicine, 2 J. MED. PHIL. 330, 365 (1977). See also Baram, Tech-
nology Assessment and Social Control, 180 ScL 465 (1973).
. See E. FRIEDSON, supra note 34, at 137 (1970).
44 See R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 340 (1973).
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a given problem. In business, markets can be expanded or new ones
created; in law, no other lawyer generally is competing with the lawyer
retained by the client to achieve a resolution of the client's problems. In
science, no scientist has a monopoly on a line of research. As Gaston
notes, "Competition in science is more like a race between runners in
the same track and over the same distance at the same time." '45 Original
discovery is prized in science. In crowded, "hot" fields such as biology,
competition tends to be particularly intense, creating strong incentives
to violate the norms of science"' by engaging in secretiveness, hasty
publication, fraud, or theft.4" The pirating of papers and falsification of
data has become more visible in recent years as major cases of cheating
in the biomedical area have emerged.48 Disruption of informal scientific
etiquette may also occur as the result of intense pressures to achieve
commercial applications of promising scientific techniques.49
Third, scientists in industry are usually seen as a subgroup with
no counterpart in law or medicine. Since their incentives are more
clearly determined by commitment to the industrial employer, their
contribution to scientific knowledge is considered secondary to academic
scientists, for reasons relating to the higher prestige of academic em-
ployment and the tension between employer demands and professional
orientation in the industrial setting.50 Academic science has been seen
as the paradigm for pure science, although it is apparent that most
4 Gaston, Secretiveness and Competition for Priority of Discovery in Physics, 9
MINERVA 472 (1971).
46 For an elaboration of the "norms," see Cournand, supra note 42, at 701.
47 See id.
48 See Broad, Fraud and the Structure of Science, 212 Sci. 137 (1981); Culliton,
Coping with Fraud: The Darsee Case, 220 Sci. 21 (1983); Schmaus, Fraud and the
Norms of Science, 8 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 12 (1983);
Schmaus, Fraud and Sloppiness in Science, I PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROFESSIONS 1
(1981); Woolf, Fraud in Science: How Much, How Serious?, 11 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 9 (1981).
Such cheating may be increasing due to increased competitiveness, or perhaps
more cheaters are being exposed as funding sources shrink. A change in attitude toward
public exposure of cheating may also account for some differences between past rates of
disclosure and the present flurry of cases. For an overview of the problem of fraud, see
W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERs OF TRUTH: FRAUD AND DECEIT IN THE HALLS
OF SCIENCE (1982).
49 See Wade, University and Drug Firm Battle Over Billion-Dollar Gene, 209
Sci. 1492, 1493 (1980). Wade concludes: "the powerful forces of the profit motive
clearly have the capacity to strain and rupture the informal traditions of scientific ex-
change." Id. at 1494.
* See Prager & Omenn, Research, Innovation, and University-Industy Link-
ages, 207 Sci. 379 (1980); see also S. KLAw, THE NEW BRAHMINS: SCIENTIFIC LIFE
IN AMERICA 71 (1968) (discussing the reasons why talented young scientists shy away




scientific areas have substantial and deepening industrial connections,
and that the great majority of scientists earn their living in technical
work.5" Recent evidence suggests that violations of scientific norms have
occurred frequently in both academia and industry.5"
The concept of autonomous scientific research depends upon a dis-
tinction between "pure science" and its applications. Pure science tradi-
tionally has been defined as a method of investigating nature by the
experimental method, seeking explanations with an aim of revealing
the processes of natural phenomena.5 ' The distinguishing characteristic
of pure science, in this view, is the end sought, the intentions of the
scientist, an almost religious drive to "know."'" This focus has provided
51 See G. RAvETz, supra note 29, at 417. ("Even the interpenetration of science
and industry can be traced back to the later nineteenth century, and can be seen as
growing continuously since then.").
0' Major rule infractions of the NIH Guidelines have occurred at the University
of California, San Francisco, and at the Harvard Medical School. See Wade, Recombi-
nant DNA: Warming Up for the Big Payoff, 206 Sci. 663 (1979). In another major
infraction, a researcher at the University of California at San Diego cloned fragments
from semliki forest virus instead of sindbis virus, for which he had permission. Then,
without authorization, he used the viral genetic material generated by the cloning to
infect mouse cells. See Wade, DNA: Chapter of Accidents at San Diego, 209 Sci. 1101
(1980); Wade, UCSD Gene Splicing Incident Ends Unresolved, 209 Sci. 1494 (1980).
Kennedy, the scientist involved, was barred for two years from research support. In
another case, a researcher at the University of California at Los Angeles used recombi-
nant DNA techniques to link normal hemoglobin from a human donor to bacterial
genes, then injected the material, combined with bone marrow from two subjects, into
the patients' leg bones. His experiment violated both the NIH guidelines for recombi-
nant DNA research and DHHS Guidelines for Experimentation on Human Subjects.
See U.S. Health Panel Urges Disciplining of Blood Researcher, Wall St. J., May 29,
1981, at 37, col. 3.
As commercial applications have proliferated, the new companies involved have
had severe operational difficulties in complying with laboratory safety guidelines. At an
inspection by NIOSH at Genentech in California, the inspection team concluded that
the management "needs to implement safety and health, medical surveillance and emer-
gency programs and procedures immediately." Quoted in I GErNTIc ENGINEERING
LETTER 2 (1981).
53 Feibleman, Pure Science, Applied Science, and Technology in THE Two-
STORY WORLD: SELECTED WRITINGs OF JAMEs K. FmL.mAN 296 (H. Cairns ed.
1966). The process is not purely an inductive one, working from experimental data to
theory. Rather, the process of hypothesis formation involves a complex "product of
organized fantasy about the real world, tested constantly by an internal logic of neces-
sity and an external logic of expectations both realized and disappointed. The theories
are the mutations in this evolutionary ecosystem of mental species; testing by logic and
by disappointed expectations is the selective process." Boulding, Science: Our Common
Heritage, 207 Sci. 831 (1980).
" See J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HuMAN VALUES 68 (1965) ("the society of
scientists is simple because it has a directing purpose: to explore the truth").
Pure theoretical sciences are concerned with the discovery of natural law
and the description of nature, and with nothing else. These sciences are
conducted by men whose chief desire is to know, and this requires a de-
tached inquiry-which Einstein has somewhere called "the holy curiosity
of inquiry" and which Emerson declared to be perpetual. Such a detach-
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the ideological underpinnings for scientific resistance to attempts by
bodies outside of science itself to regulate research. As with other pro-
fessions, the claim of autonomy is based in part upon an ideological
concept of service, which in the case of science is service in pursuit of
knowledge. 55 In our society, freedom of scientific inquiry, which de-
pends upon a concept of pure science, is a cherished value; traditionally
there has been thought to be less risk associated with pure science than
with its large-scale technological applications.
5
1
The pure science ideal pales, however, in light of the relationship
between contemporary scientific research and its technological applica-
tions. The muddying of traditional distinctions has occurred in several
ways. First, in problem solving, science must use advanced technology,
with its physical tools becoming more complex and demanding. Elec-
tron microscopes and high-speed computers permit far more sophisti-
cated measurements, but at a much greater cost.57 Maintenance of the
instruments then comes to require a team of technicians as part of a
"corporate," bureaucratic enterprise, a super-team effort. 8 Second, the
cost of both the tools and the staff require large maintenance funds,
which come from outside sources, thereby affecting the independence of
the researcher. Third, science often receives its assignments of problems
ment and such a pursuit are comparable in their high seriousness of pur-
pose only to religion and art.
Feibleman, supra note 53, at 300.
" See Technology and Science as "Ideology", in J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 81 (1970). Applied science, following the conventional distinction, is
"a system of concrete interpretations of scientific propositions directed to some end use-
ful for human life." Id. at 36. Applied science and technology share a common goal:
control or manipulation of the world. Technology, however, is a step removed from
applied science: it is simply an increasingly developed use of instruments. Technology is
an activity whose characteristic outcomes are material, rather than intellectual, with the
intended purpose of expanding the physical range of the humanly possible. See Mc-
Ginn, What is Technology? in RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 179
(Durbin ed. 1978).
" For a spirited defense of scientific inquiry that places the burden of proof on
those who propose to regulate for any reason, see Cohen, When May Research Be
Stopped?, 296 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1203, 1207 (1977). But see Bok, Freedom and
Risk, 107 DAEDALUS 115, 123 (1978). For a statement of the assumption that pure
science is less risky than its applications, see Hadden, Regulation of Recombinant DNA
Research, in M. RICHARDS, RECOMBINANT DNA: SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS
216 (1980).
57 See G. RAvErz, supra note 29, at 194-99; Jonas, Freedom of Scientific Inquiry
and the Public Interest in REGULATION OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 33, 36 (K. Wulff ed.
1979).
1 See G. RAvETZ, supra note 29, at 44-47; see also Cavalieri, Science as Technol-
ogy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1978) ("scientific research has become a
camoflauged superteam effort, comprised of a team or teams already existing in the
research laboratory coupled to a commercial team or teams supplying the instrument").
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to select for solution from the state of the relevant technology,59 both
because it is the technology of tools that decides what areas can now be
investigated practically and because the demands of a technologically
developing area with commercial promise create a demand for re-
search. 0 Science has come to depend upon successful applications of
pure research to enable scientists to argue for continuing support.
There is thus a continual spiral of support and application.
In any event, the distinction between thought and action cannot
serve to immunize pure science from regulation. The process of scien-
tific experimentation, as part of the process of hypothesis testing, artic-
ulation, and refinement, is action. Theory and practice are insepara-
ble.61 One might still contend that it is the intent of the researcher that
is determinative-exploring an abstract question involved in his field,
or seeking practical applications-but this distinction breaks down in
the recombinant DNA context, as more researchers wear the hats of
both pure scientists and industry researcher.6 2
59 See Boulding, supra note 53, at 833 ("Measurement is a function of technology,
and it could well be indeed, that technology has contributed more to science historically
than science has to technology. There is at least a constant feedback between them.").
'0 See G. RAvETz, supra note 29, at 93 (contending that most of the science prac-
ticed today has at least a speculative relationship to a potential technology).
6i Legal scholars have muddled this area by distinguishing between regulation of
health and safety hazards resulting from technological applications, and regulation of
"basic" research, or "'original investigations for the advancement of scientific knowl-
edge-which do not have specific (practical) objectives' or ends in view." Delgado &
Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific
Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349, 352, n.21 (1978) (quoting NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, SCIENCE INDICATORS 53 (1975)); see also Green, The Boundaries of Scientific
Freedom, HARV. NEwsLETTER ON Sci. TECH. AND HUMAN VALUES, June 1977, at
17 (referring to experimentation as action). Robertson is surely right that "[t]he pres-
ence of physical activity in research or other expression may implicate other state inter-
ests that justify limitation, but the semantic characterization of experimentation as con-
duct is not a magical property that excludes First Amendment protection." Robertson,
The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REv. 484, 505 n.127 (1979); see
also Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19 ARiz. L. REv.
893 (1977).
62 Freedom of scientific inquiry has been raised as a barrier to regulation of scien-
tific research, protecting not only freedom of thought or speech, but also action, which
in the doing of science is empirical observation and the testing of hypotheses. A consti-
tutional argument can be made that regulation of research based upon political or social
grounds is impermissible. See Delgado & Millen, supra note 61. Experimentation, as
an integral part of the scientific process of hypothesis formulation and evaluation, has
been likened to news gathering, which falls under first amendment protection. See
Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) ("academic researchers" included
among those performing an "informative" function).
The speech/action dichotomy is too crude to provide an analytical framework for
the regulation of science, although the similarity of experimentation to action, or con-
duct, has been noted, arguably with resulting loss of first amendment protection. Emer-
son has been a principal advocate of the speech/action distinction. See T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 8, 17 (1970); see also Ferguson, Scientific
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C. A Starting Point for Analysis
The paradigm case suggests that scientific research may in some
contexts create substantial risks, that the claims of pure science to au-
tonomy are not justified, and that a systematic theory of institutional
regulation of research hazards is needed. The recombinant DNA con-
troversy presents sharply the question of uncertainty in research. The
following hypothetical situation provides a specific setting in which the
general claims of this article can be tested."3 A university laboratory has
begun research on a rare African disease, and the scientists involved
plan to use recombinant DNA techniques to explore the nature and the
mechanisms by which the disease functions. The rDNA technique has
just been recognized as possibly revolutionary, and the media has run
one or two stories suggesting that hazards exist as well. Individuals in
the community in which the university is located, and adjoining com-
munities, express concern over the hazards of such work. No federal
agency presently claims jurisdiction over such research. No tort damage
action is available, since no identifiable harm has yet occurred. Talks
with university administrators have proven difficult to arrange and pro-
duce no change in the planned research. The facility is in an area of
the community zoned for research, and operates according to present
state regulations governing laboratory protocols.
Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639, 650-51 (1979); Green,
supra note 61, at 17-18. Since science in all fields requires experimentation as a part of
progress, just as most areas of expression require some activity as part of generating
and communicating ideas, physical activity by itself is not a useful test for demarcating
the boundaries of protection. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 598-
601 (1978); Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines,
82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968); Robertson, supra note 61, at 505. We are brought
back to a sphere of regulation based upon risks to individual health and environment,
rather than upon the content of research. Regulation based upon the police power,
protecting the public health and safety, raises few significant constitutional problems.
See Delgado & Millen, supra note 61, at 380. The police power enables states to legis-
late and take action to promote "the peace, good order, morals, and health of the com-
munity," Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145-46 (1876). It is, however, subject to some
constitutional limits. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm.,
294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Where a
line of research is inherently hazardous, appropriate action under the police power is
permissible.
'$ An accident at Plum Island, the site of a Department of Agriculture Animal
Disease Center off Long Island, New York, produced the kind of situation upon which
the hypothetical is based. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease occurred in Septem-
ber, 1978. It is not known how the virus escaped from the research facility, the
equivalent of a P4 laboratory like that in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Neighboring com-
munities on Long Island expressed concern about the research at the facility because of
a plan to begin research on Rift Valley fever, an exotic African disease which had
recently developed into a health menace in Egypt. See Wade, Accident and Hostile
Citizens Beset Animal Disease Laboratory, 202 Sei. 723 (1978).
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The problem presents two issues: how to evaluate institutional
mechanisms for dealing with the potential hazard, and how to assign
the burden of proof as to the nature and extent of the hazard.
II. MODELS FOR GOVERNING PUBLIC RISKS
A. Criteria for Evaluating Risk-Governing Models
Four basic criteria for comparing approaches to the regulation of
research hazards can be articulated, considering as a paradigm case re-
combinant DNA research and its history." It is proposed that any
model for governing public risks can be evaluated in light of its effec-
tiveness in braking the momentum of research areas, counteracting bias
of those involved in the risk-creatinig activity, generating relevant and
accurate information, and promoting public participation.
1. Provision of a Trigger/Brake
The recombinant DNA controversy furnishes ample evidence of
the momentum which can accumulate as a promising line of research
develops.6 5 Critics have pointed out that risk assessment procedures
have not been carried out in many cases before the expansion of re-
search in the area. 6 The prevalent attitude in the scientific commu-
" Tribe has proposed five objectives of technology assessment: the general wel-
fare; the preservation of options (with irreversibility a primary criteria); the burden of
uncertainty as it relates to generating information about secondary effects; the creation
of constituencies; and the achievement of consistency. L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECH-
NOLOGY THROUGH LAW 19-28 (1973). These are valuable goals in a broad sense, but
are not directly relevant in testing institutional capacities. Rather, they offer a mix of
normative and practical considerations for policymaking.
For a look at criteria for evaluating procedures in the nuclear power context, see
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA.
L. REv. 585 (1972) (suggesting accuracy, efficiency and acceptability as three central
criteria).
65 Wade, Recombinant DNA: Warning Up for the Big Payoffl, 206 Sci. 663
(1979).
" See Letter from Philip Bereano to Dr. Donald Fredrickson (Oct. 8, 1979), re-
printed in 5 RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH 346 (1980) (HEW Documents Relating
to "NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules," January
1979 - January 1980) [hereinafter cited as HEW Documents].
That assessment has been recently reiterated by a knowledgable student and critic
of the rDNA controversy:
NIH's risk-assessment plan has been meager in comparison to the antici-
pated scope of applications for gene splicing. Scientists have shown little
concern for experimental protocols that examine risks. Moreover, as pub-
lic pressure for restraint in biotechnology waned, less importance was
placed on risk-assessment programs.
Krimsky, Science Perverted: Can It Happen Here?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RaP. 42, 43
(1983).
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nity-that dangers have been overrated-may be due as much to the
tremendous progress being made in research as to new experiments
which clearly and definitively answer questions.6 7 Risk assessment ex-
periments have revealed that the magnitude of hazard was higher than
originally expected: bacteria containing recombinant DNA remain alive
in humans 500 times longer than previously estimated; 8 another study
reported that a recombinant gene containing a cancer virus can produce
tumors in mice.69 These studies had serious implications for rDNA re-
search, suggesting that controls should be maintained rather than
weakened. 0
It is therefore necessary to provide a means to trigger a "gover-
nor"-a method by which the expansion of research can be checked in
order to allow more careful evaluation of risks, benefits, and future
developments. Public control over funding has often been suggested as
an adequate brake on potentially hazardous research.7 1 Such funding
decisions, however, do not affect most industrial research. Thus, as
more basic research is done either by industry or through industrial-
academic cooperation, the controls possible through federal funding will
be further weakened. In addition, federal funding decisions are pres-
ently determined primarily by the values of the members of the scien-
tific community.72 Participation by nonscientists in the peer review
funding process has been suggested as a means of incorporating other
values into the priorities of funded research, but little movement in this
direction is evident."
What is needed is "a more deliberate, explicit, and somewhat
more pessimistic consideration of the area of uncertainty as to potential
'7 This viewpoint was most recently expressed by Gershon, Should Science Be
Stopped: The Case of Recombinant DNA Research, 71 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1983).
" See Levy & Marshall, 2 RECOMBINANT DNA TECH. BULL. 77 (1979).
69 See Israel, Chan, Rowe & Martin, Molecular Cloning of Polyoma Virus DNA
in Escherichia coli: Plasmid Vector System, 203 Sci. 883 (1979); Chan, Israel, Garon,
Rowe & Martin, Lambda Phage Vector System, 203 Sci. 887 (1979).
70 See Rosenberg & Simon, Recombinant DNA: have recent experiments assessed
all the risks?, 282 NATURE 773 (1979). For a critical view of the risk assessments done
to date, see S. KRIMSKY, supra note 22, at 215-84, suggesting that experiments pur-
porting to show zero risk can be faulted on several grounds.
71 See Baltimore, Limiting Science: A Biologist's Perspective, 107 DAEDALUS 37,
44 (1978). 0
72 See Dworkin, Biocatastrophe and the Law: Legal Aspects of Recombinant DNA
Research, in THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE 219 (D. Jackson & S. Stich, eds.,
1979); see also Baram, The Social Control of Science and Technology, 47 DENv. L.J.
567, 573 (1970).
73 See the remarks of Steven Schwarcz, reprinted in Symposium: Curbing Igno-
rance and Arrogance: The Science Court Proposal and Alternatives, 19 JURiMETRics
J. 387, 425 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
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hazards, '7 4 triggered by some mechanism to focus attention on the pu-
tative hazards of research and to mobilize resources for further inquiry,
while dampening the momentum which a promising line of research
accumulates.
2. Counteraction of bias
An effective scientific review mechanism must provide a method of
evaluation without institutionalizing the biases of the major actors in-
volved in the research-those with a vested interest in its continua-
tion.7 5 Review boards such as those charged with evaluating funded
research involving human subjects provide an example of a device with
the potential to allow substantial lay decisionmaking power at the ini-
tial stages of research on a case-by-case basis, although the actual im-
pact of lay members has been questioned.76 In scientific research not
involving human subjects, bio-safety committees have in a few cases
exercised power over a line of research where violations were alleged,7
but such committees are apparently dominated by scientists favorable to
the research.78 Some means of interjecting new perspectives into scien-
tific decisionmaking can serve a valuable function in altering scientists'
perspectives about their responsibilities and the nature of the risks in-
herent in their research."
3. Generation of Relevant and Accurate Information
The institutional mechanism chosen must lead to a more complete
record on the factual issues bearing on a line of research by creating
incentives for parties to produce information. The mechanism should
focus not only upon the risks of the particular line of research, but also
upon alternate means of achieving the same results at which the re-
search aims. Sufficient resources must be available for opponents of the
WHarold Green, quoted in L. CAVALIERI, THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX 131
(1981).
75 For a general discussion of the problems of counteracting bias, see Schneyer,
Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure
Practices, 1976 Wis. L. Rav. 124.
76 See DuVal, The Human Subject Protection Committee: An Experiment in De-
centralized Federal Regulation, 1979 A.B.F.J. 571.
77 See Wade, DNA: Chapter of Accidents at San Diego, 209 Sci. 1101 (1980).
76 Id.
79 For a well-developed argument for lay participation in scientific research of all
kinds, see Holman & Dutton, A Case for Public Participation in Science Policy Forma-
tion and Practice, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1505 (1978); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 64,
at 35; comments by D. Nelkin, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 73, at 420.
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research to gather information. 0
4. Promotion of Public Participation
The extent of public participation has often been cited as a goal
against which to measure various approaches to technological
problems."1 Such participation offers several benefits. First, it may lead
to more accurate resolution of the issues by bringing in alternative
viewpoints and unexpected perspectives.82 Increased accuracy is by no
means an inevitable result of increased participation, but requires care-
ful control by a judge, an agency, or a mediator to ensure proper repre-
sentation and adequate resources for parties to facilitate their represen-
tation."3 Second, it may increase the confidence of citizens in the
fairness of decisionmaking, whether private or government, that affects
their lives. 8 It may even be seen as a kind of crude political process in
which a vote (or at least a protest) can be cast. 5 Third, participation is
so NIH drafted an environmental impact statement (EIS) in response to the con-
troversy over the research, court challenges, and criticism by legal scholars. See NIH,
Environmental Impact Statement on NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombi-
nant DNA Molecules (Oct. 1977). However, the statement failed to address the range
of risks and alternatives in a realistic way. See Chalker & Catz, A Case Analysis of
NEPA hnplementation: NIH and DNA Recombinant Research, 1978 DUKE L.J. 57,
61 & 95.
One may be cynical generally about the effect of impact statements on the behavior
of those proposing activities. As critics have observed in a study of one federal agency:
"NEPA had not greatly affected either the types of alternatives being considered or
who and what influenced the formulation and evaluation of these alternatives." Hill &
Ortolano, NEPA's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18
NAT. RESOURcES J. 285, 311 (1978).
11 See D. NELKIN, TECHNOLOGICAL DEcISIONs AND DEMOCRACY: EUROPEAN
EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLC PARTICIPATION (1977).
8 Many of the values fostered by increased participation have been noted in the
administrative law context. See, e.g., Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal
Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511, 511-22 (1969); Johnson, A New Fidelity to the
Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 875-76 (1971). But as Stewart observes in The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1777 (1975),
the expanded public interest representation model does not guarantee exposure and
analysis of relevant issues. See Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827
(2d Cir. 1974) (tidal flow in Hudson at project site, increasing potential danger to fish
life, not discovered until after ten years of agency and court proceedings). "The power
to start a serious and credible technical controversy lies in few hands, notably the envi-
ronmental and consumer groups, and some prestigious scientists who have good access
to the nation's mass media [citation omitted]. Controversies which come from less ortho-
dox sources have trouble gaining credibility in higher circles." A. MA.ZUR, supra note
4, at 131.
"' Proposals for funding public representation have often been made. See Lazarus
& Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1097-1104 (1971).
Rewards of attorney's fees in private litigation can also provide a valuable incentive for
public interest litigation.
See Cramton, supra note 64, at 593.
* See Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems
[Vol. 131:1403
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intrinsically valuable, acknowledging the right of individuals to know
about risks affecting their well-being. 6 Participation is thus an impor-
tant goal, as it has a utilitarian or efficiency justification (it may lead to
better science in some cases), a political justification (it legitimates a
line of research), and a normative justification (it furthers the public's
right to know about public risks).,7
Public participation in scientific decisionmaking, particularly at
the early stages of development of a line of research, usually has been
limited or nonexistent.8 While varying degrees of public involvement
occurred in the rDNA controversy, for example, through public hear-
ings at the local government level in Cambridge, Massachusetts and
other localities, severe limitations on that participation have been ap-
parent. Participation has been sought after research agendas were set;
mechanisms for involving the public have been reactive, commencing
well after the problem areas have emerged; participation, requiring re-
sources to be meaningful, has usually not included less privileged
groups or individuals; and participation at its best has been advisory
rather than directive, rarely granting non-scientists substantial say over
a line of research or a newly emerging technology. 9
It is therefore necessary to design a mechanism that can generate
information at the outset from those most familiar with and best able to
analyze potential hazards, that is sufficient to trigger broader scrutiny
of Environmental Quality, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1070 (1970). Tribe has pointed out that
it is an error to assume that "[clhange which is initiated through litigation is inherently
less democratic than change in which legislative or administrative bodies take the domi-
nant role." Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense of the Adversary Process - A
Reply to Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 43, 53 (1978). He refers to Archi-
bald Cox's statement that a citizen feels little more of a sense of participation in the
legislative process than in the judicial. See A. Cox, THE ROLE or THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 116 (1976).
86 See McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward Increased
Responsiveness, 13 Amiz. L. REv. 835 (1971); Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideol-
ogy, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66, 83 (1972).
97 The recognition of the importance of participation values in litigation can be
found in Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974) and Thibault & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 541 (1978). But see Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 95 ("not only does the judicial pro-
ceeding tend to be held in low esteem by the population as a whole, but it is even less
well regarded by those who have actually had the experience of participating in it
directly as litigants").
" See Holman & Dutton, supra note 79.
89 Protests against science may be protests against the power relationships associ-
ated with it, "less against specific technological disputes than against the declining ca-
pacity of citizens to shape policies that affect their interests; less against science than
against the use of scientific rationality to mask political choices." D. Nelkin, reprinted
in Symposium, supra note 73, at 420.
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by those whose interests have not vested in the particular line of re-
search, and that can suggest an appropriate regulatory response.
B. Alternative Models
Institutional models to cope with controversies of a "science and
society" nature have been spawned, in the academic literature if not in
reality, in contemporary controversies such as those surrounding nu-
clear power generation, Laetrile, and recombinant DNA research. The
models fall into three broad categories, based upon their primary pur-
pose: investigation, making a preliminary determination of the nature
and extent of the risks and benefits involved; resolution, deciding
whether and how to proceed with a hazardous activity in areas of scien-
tific uncertainty; and, control, regulating the activity on a continuing
basis. These purposes are sequential in most cases, since the nature and
extent of the hazard must be identified prior to a decision on how to
proceed and control can best result from an informed decision on the
acceptable course of action. Regulation of novel hazards, however, must
proceed in the face of uncertainty, with investigation and decisions con-
tinually reshaping the extent and nature of regulatory control.
A second way in which to compare alternative models is based
upon the values of the participants: the elitist models, in which the val-
ues of scientists predominate, and the public models, in which the
"public" can be said to participate and exercise control. Certain mod-
els, such as the legislative Science Court,90 fall clearly into a particular
category, while others, such as the civil damage action, serve several
purposes and incorporate both expert and non-expert viewpoints. Even
models that appear to straddle categories, however, tend to be domi-
nated by one source of values while serving only one principal purpose.
1. Elitist Investigation Models
Early discovery of hazard is an essential purpose of any mecha-
nism for dealing with scientific controversy because a promising line of
research can quickly develop beyond the point of easy control.
Scientific discovery and disclosure of problem areas, within the in-
formal framework of scientific norms of self-governance, is presently
the only existing source of information. A scientist working at the fron-
tiers of a new development may thus be sufficiently troubled by a po-
tential development to raise questions publicly. As an early warning
system, responsible scientific norms may aid in the assessment of new
90 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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hazards. The reliance on such self-governance has at its root the con-
cept of scientists as professionals, subject putatively to the higher norms
of professional practice. They have a service orientation toward society
at large, and their primary goal is the pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake. According to the argument, we should therefore trust scientists to
police themselves, to recognize new problem areas, and to point them
out as objects of needed regulatory action. 1 A warning by one re-
searcher, however, does not imply a willingness on the part of those
working in the area to stop temporarily or to listen to a colleague's
reservations.9 2 In the recombinant DNA controversy the field has been
divided, with most researchers in favor of proceeding with research
under the NIH gtfidelines and a minority adamantly opposed to even
the NIH guidelines. Once a research area is "hot," scientists, like any
professionals, will face a conflict between norms of caution and their
interest in career advancement and recognition by their peers. Self-reg-
ulation may work in promoting good as opposed to shoddy science,93
but it is the risks inherent in good as well as shoddy research that cause
concern.
A formal scientist/government early warning system has been pro-
posed to surmount the limits of reliance on informal sources of infor-
mation from practitioners. Expansion of the mandate of the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) has been suggested as a way to provide
a mechanism for spotting emerging controversies. The OTA was cre-
ated legislatively in 1972, and has come to provide supplemental analy-
sis to legislative committees concerned with science and techology. OTA
has tended to focus on technological applications rather than basic re-
search. It has been primarily reactive, responding only when asked by
Congress. While it has the advantage of a staff and a continuing man-
date to look broadly at scientific developments as they occur, it is likely
91 See Stich, The Recombinant DNA Debate: Some Philosophical Considerations,
in THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE, supra note 72, at 200-01.
92 Stich noted that the scientists involved in the Asilomar conference took an un-
precedented step in pointing out the hazards of their research:
Their actions have been widely and justifiably praised as an exemplar of
moral responsibility in the scientific community. Yet ... two years after
the Asilomar conference, it is an open secret that a number of the scientists
who are responsible for Asilomar are disillusioned, and perhaps a bit bit-
ter .... Privately, a number of the scientists who participated in the
Asilomar Conference now say that if they had it to do over again, they
would have "kept their mouths shut" and never brought their concerns
about safety to the attention of a wider audience.
Id.; see also Boone, When Scientists Go Public With Their Doubts, 12 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 12, 16 (1982).
93 See G. RAVETZ, supra note 58, at 49.
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to act well after a line of research is underway. One suggestion has
been to expand OTA's mandate and establish long-term relationships
with academic scientists who could "provide a sophisticated early warn-
ing system, by pointing to, and conducting initial evaluations of, signifi-
cant new scientific discoveries." 4 The proposal has merit, assuming
congressional willingness to expand OTA's staff and budget; it de-
pends, however, upon an assumption that a scientist's career will not be
sidetracked by expending his energy on such assessment studies rather
than on basic research. It may be that only the mediocre will develop
such relationships while the top scientists continue to pursue the inter-
esting questions at the cutting edges of their fields.
Simon Ramo recently has proposed an administrative model, a sort
of "technological FBI," in which scientific experts would be placed in
one administrative unit to deal with "technological negatives.""5 This
would lead to efficiency and flexibility of organization, obviating the
need for Congress "to perceive a new danger and launch still another
agency to handle it."9 This model raises several questions. Will the
scientists that work for such an agency do any better than current ad-
ministrative agency staffs at detecting hazards at the forefront of scien-
tific and technological developments? Will not the need for specialized
knowledge about different categories of hazards-biological, ecological,
drug-related-require distinct units which will quickly come to resem-
ble the research components of existing agencies? The fundamental
problem is that congressional action is required to set up yet another
agency, albeit with a broader mandate, in an area that has proven
highly resistant to administrative control and at a time when deregula-
tion is a principal political goal.
2. Public Investigation Models
Few precedents exist for such an approach, although the Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts hearings on recombinant DNA research are
often cited as an example.97 In 1976 a citizen review board was estab-
Capron, Reflections on Issues Posed by Recombinant DNA Molecule Technol-
ogy, 265 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 71, 75-77 (1976). A more elaborate suggestion was
that a joint commission be formed, chosen by the President and Congress, using the
office of the Science Advisor to channel scientific expertise, and the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment for assessment experience, and the executive agencies and congressional
committees for public reaction. See Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the
NIH Guidelines, 194 Sci. 1133 (1976).
" Ramo, Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, 213 Sci. 837,
842 (1981).
" Id.
9 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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lished to advise the Cambridge City council, based on the principle that
a citizen group could investigate a problem area and reach a decision.9"
Yet insofar as academic scientists focused the agenda on short-term
health harms and safety measures, such a public investigatory approach
was essentially "structured discussions over predetermined policy with
few real options." 99 Public hearings at the state or federal level in
many areas of technological controversy usually have involved public
participation at the decision level, primarily as a means of gaining pub-
lic approval for a decision whose merits had already been prejudged.
3. Elitist Resolution Models
The elitist resolution models have attracted the most attention
from commentators, with a plethora of suggestions for allowing expert
scientists, through various institutional formats, to reach agreement on
issues of risk and thereby promote public consensus and legislative
action.
The legislative Science Court, first proposed by Arthur Kantro-
witz, allows a scientific or technologial controversy, such as the recom-
binant DNA dispute, to be evaluated by a panel of expert judges after
an adversarial presentation of evidence is made. Such an institution,
according to its proponents,100 would separate fact from values in a
controversy, separate the functions of the judge from those of the advo-
cate, and provide an open, public procedure with the process and con-
clusions available to all.
The variations on Kantrowitz's Science Court model include a
Technical Review Board, 01 a Technological Magistrature,10 2 and Cer-
tified Public Scientists.
108
A variety of criticisms can be leveled against such a Science Court
98 See Letter from J. Sullivan, City Manager, to City Council of Cambridge,
Massachusetts (August 6, 1976): "Decisions regarding the appropriate course between
the risks and benefits of potentially dangerous scientific inquiry must not be adjudicated
within the inner circles of the scientific establishment ... a lay citizens group can face
a technical scientific matter of general and deep public concern, educate itself appropri-
ately to the task and reach a fair decision." [copy on file at University of Penn.lvania
Law Review].
" Nelkin & Pollak, Problems and Procedures in the Regulation of Technological
Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 246 (R. Schwing & W. Albers ed. 1980).
100 See Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL 48 (1977) and ref-
erences cited therein.
101 See B. ACKERMAN, S. ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UN-
CERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 156 (1974).
102 See Bugliarello, A Technological Magistrature, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Jan. 1978,
at 34.
103 See Glick, Reflections and Speculations on the Reulation of Molecular Ge-
netic Research, 265 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 178, 189 (1976).
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model and its variations. It tends to confuse values, obscuring the real
policy choices under a camoflauge of "objective" scientific fact.1" A de-
cision by the Science Court may carry too much weight for government
decisionmakers because of the elaborate nature of the process and the
presumed validity of the results.1 05 The authoritative determination of a
scientific issue by a governmentally established body may hurt scientific
independence as well, because disputed issues are normally resolved by
the norms of the scientific community itself over time.01 Finally, the
areas that are likely to be presented for resolution are either going to be
in the "penumbra of unsettled scientific questions or in the area of pub-
lic policy." In neither case is a Science Court the appropriate forum for
resolution.10 7 While such a model may be worth trying on an experi-
mental basis to ascertain whether the criticisms are as serious as they
appear, it is unlikely to serve sufficiently the goal of an early warning
system, although it may provide clarification of factual disputes over a
scientific controversy.
08
A scientific "town meeting" model, following the precedent of the
Asilomar Conference on the hazards of recombinant DNA research, 09
has been offered as a means by which a profession can render a deci-
sion in a controversial area within its specialty. It is essentially a more
organized and structured version of self-regulation through norms and
social interaction. The goal is to achieve a professional consensus
through regular meetings. As a model, such an approach is severely
limited by its lack of enforcement power, its inability to respond in a
timely manner, and the likelihood of reaching consensus while avoiding
real issues. Even if a consensus is achieved on a substantive point, it
does not bind those who disagree other than through moral suasion. 10
Such meetings are likely to be called well after interest in, and work
104 See Nelkin, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 73, at 421 ("The belief that
science is inherently removed from political considerations and that scientists are, there-
fore, political celibates is a longstanding one, but in the present social context of science,
it is an anachronism.").
105 See generally Martin, The Proposed Science Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058
(1977); Nelkin, Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research, 107
DAEDULUS 191, 203 (1978).
106 See Loevinger, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 73, at 393.
'o7 See Gross, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 73, at 452.
108 See Martin, supra note 105, at 1090-91.
109 For journalistic accounts of the conference, see J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD:
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE MANIPULATION OF LIFE (1979); M. ROGERS, BI-
OHAZARD (1977); N. WADE, THE ULTIMATE ExPERIMENT (1979).
110 See Dworkin, Science, Society, and the Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments
on Asilomar, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1471, 1479-80 (1978) ("Moral suasion is wonderful,
but it is not enough ... [t]he real town meeting gained its legal as well as its moral,
authority from the existence of consensus. No such consensus exists with respect to the
social issues posed by modem science.").
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on, a line of research has begun, so that commitments to that work are
entrenched. Like the New England town meeting, the consensus may
be based upon the dominant values and norms of those most favorable
to the research, having all of the problems that professional self-regula-
tion normally possesses."'
4. Public Decision Models
Decision models oriented toward lay rather than expert values
range from decentralized models like civil actions in tort to proposals
for "decision boards," operating within the executive branch, comprised
of educated laymeh.
a. Compensatory Tort Actions
A traditional litigation model based on tort suits for damages done
to person or property is available. Such tort litigation was once seen as
a powerful tool for technology assessment, forcing risk-creating activi-
ties to internalize the costs they imposed on society. 1 2 If harm occurred
to a laboratory worker, or a neighbor, because of hazardous research,
then the person or his estate could sue the laboratory, the university,
the industry-whichever actor was legally responsible."1 In theory, the
specter of such liability for damages would provide a substantial deter-
rent against the dangerous practices, as well as an incentive for the
risk-creator to take greater care.114 This model thus protects common
law entitlements to liberty and property, while theoretically also fur-
thering economic efficiency.
In reality, in the context of modern hazards characterized by long
latency periods and complicated causal connections, tort liability is an
ineffective tool for assessing technology. First, the diffuse nature of the
harm may result in failure to generate adequate incentives: the prodig-
ious problems of proof of both damages and causation will deter such
suits. The escape of nuclear radiation, or a bacteria altered through
"I The fear of domination by a majority was noted by Madison in THE FEDER-
AIST No. 10, at 58 (Modem Library College ed. 1937).
12 See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U.
CINN. L. REv. 587 (1969); Note, The Cost-Internationalization Case for Class Actions,
21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969).
"I Such a suit has been brought against the University of Birmingham, where a
laboratory using smallpox toxins caused the death of a university photographer whose
office was above the lab. See Hawkes, Smallpox Death in Britain Challenges Presump-
tion of Laboratory Safety, 203 Sci. 855 (1979).
11' The law and economics literature treats this problem in considerable detail.
See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDNTS (1970), particularly the chap-
ters on general deterrence.
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recombinant DNA techniques, may cause long-term effects that can
only be discovered by an epidemiological analysis twenty years after the
fact." 5 This low-grade effect, plus the extended latency period for
many diseases such as cancer, poses severe causal complexities. Courts
have struggled to alter traditional rules of causation to deal with the
problems of multiple causation and long latency periods.11 Where the
damage can be linked to both natural and man-made causes, however,
it is unlikely that even altered causation rules can handle the complex-
ity with sufficient consistency to provide the necessary deterrent against
highly uncertain risks.
Second, the effective representation of future generations, seem-
ingly essential given genetically damaging and irreversible effects, may
be hard to secure in the traditional litigation framework.117 A damage
suit, requiring that a specific plaintiff show present concrete harm, can
hardly take into account harm to nonspecific future populations. Fi-
nally, the specter of a damage award will not necessarily deter the haz-
ardous activity, or even change the method of operation. The risk-creat-
ing entity is merely forced to make a tradeoff between the damage
award in other cases, discounted by its probability, as against the bene-
fits of continuing with the activity unchanged. The power of the com-
pensatory tort lawsuit is thus too slow, too indirect, and too uncertain
to provide a powerful decisionmaking device.
b. Mediation-Negotiation
Mediation-negotiation models entail voluntary participation by
contesting parties who meet face-to-face in discussions with a third
party, the mediator or arbitrator, to facilitate the resolution of disputes.
In scientific mediation, 18 technical experts representing different views
would, with the assistance of a mediator, write a joint paper to explain
areas of agreement and disagreement, each scientist's reasons for disa-
greement on each point, and further information needed before a deci-
sion can be made. It has similarities to the Science Court model in its
quasi-adversarial presentation of opposing viewpoints, but with the me-
115 See Recombinant DNA Research Act of 1977: Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86, 86-96 (1977) (comments of Prof. Hubbard).
"I See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138
(1978), rev'd, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980). See generally Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the
DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981).
11 See generally Furrow, Legislative and Judicial Remedies for Environmental
Wrongs, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 536 (1972).
11 See Abrams, Nuclear Politics in Sweden, 21 ENVIRONMENT 6 (1979).
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diator narrowing the issues with the consent of the parties rather than
a panel of judges resolving the issue. Like the Science Court, it proba-
bly would not be useful until rather late in the development of a con-
troversy. Moreover, adequate participation would be difficult to define
or assess. Although the process could rely upon the input of those indi-
viduals and groups who care strongly enough to enter the negotiations,
including laymen, government involvement would probably be neces-
sary to set the process in motion. In addition, mediation works best
when the protagonists share a common ground which might lead to a
satisfactory compromise. In technological controversies, however, antag-
onist groups are ill-defined; they may not share the values necessary to
resolve the dispute'in the absence of a more coercive framework such as
that provided by litigation, in which a decision, Whether based upon
concensus or not, must be reached.
c. Decision Boards
A "decision board" concept has been offered by Ramo as part of
his overall proposal, which includes the technological FBI discussed
above.1 9 Following an investigation, various boards would be ap-
pointed by the President as needed. Congress, the President, or the in-
vestigatory agency could use the decision boards to resolve a question in
areas of scientific uncertainty, and each would have its jurisdiction de-
fined by Congress. It is hard to see how this differs from current
agency structures, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
or what it adds to present agency regulation.
5. Elitist Control Models
Professional self-regulation can operate successfully in theory, but
there are significant problems in practice, as noted above. 20 This
model builds upon scientists' capacity to investigate a problem area re-
lying on their capacity to impose sanctions on those working in danger-
ous areas.121 The Asilomar Conference, at which recombinant DNA
was discussed, is cited as one example of such self-governance. 22 If the
effectiveness of self-regulation in other professions such as medicine is
any guide, however, the regulation is likely to be limited to spotting the
incompetent or dishonest practitioner and forcing him out. 23 Actual
19 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
121 See id.
122 See infra note 148.
a For a general discussion of self-regulation in the medical profession, and its
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cessation of a hot line of research or self-imposition of controls is un-
likely given the infractions that have occurred under the NIH Guide-
lines governing recombinant DNA research.
Public control over funds is considered sufficient by most scientists
to control problems of research. Government funding controls provide a
lever for compelling disclosure of the details of research and the imposi-
tion of conditions upon its conduct. 24 The problem with relying on
such an approach as a means of control of the risks of a new line of
research is twofold. First, the decisionmakers in the agency assigned the
function of deciding on allocation of monies are often either former re-
searchers themselves or program directors who must rely on peer re-
view, raising questions of bias and conflict of interest.125 If the re-
searcher promises exciting new advances within the scope of the
funding agency's mandate, then the agency will also benefit from suc-
cesses in the research through continued congressional funding. The
pressure is toward encouraging research which is "good" science, even
though it may be risky science. In fact, the exercise of the power to cut
off funds or to impose sanctions for the violation of agency guidelines
has only rarely been exercised.1 21 Second, research by private industry
is not affected by government funding restrictions. Current evidence
suggests that in the swift move to exploit commercial applications of
biological technologies, new companies have violated a number of safety
guidelines.1
27
Agency regulation of technological hazards is the most familiar
and best developed regulatory model, offering a rich variety of regula-
limitations, see E. FREIDSON, supra note 43.
124 See Robertson, supra note 61, at 506-08, for a discussion of state-imposed
limitations as a condition of funding.
12 An example of the failure of peer review mechanisms to prevent an accident is
the smallpox death in Bedson's laboratory in Birmingham, England. As Wade Hawkes
noted, "the system appears to have connived at breaches of the most elementary kind in
laboratory security simply because Bedson was a well-known figure. . . ." Hawkes,
Smallpox Death in Britain Challenges Presumption of Laboratory Safety, 203 Sct. 855
(1979).
128 See supra note 124.
127 An inspection of Genentech's recombinant DNA facilities in April, 1980, re-
vealed major safety problems, including use of glass instead of metal flasks. See
Genentech Plant's Faults Attributed to Rapid Growth by NIOSH, 1 GENETIC ENG.
LETTER 2, 3 (1981). The defects fly in the face of the conventional notions that large
scale applications are safer than laboratory work or at least no more risky. See Gordon,
Hazards of Making the Same Product by Recombinant DNA as Compared to Other
Methods, 3 RECOMBINANT DNA BULL. 209 (1980). Gordon concluded: "Containment
and other safety procedures have long been standard for both fermentation and pet-
rochemical processes, on a plant scale. Accidents are extremely rare if established proto-
cols are followed. However, if the remotely possible happens (e.g., failure of automatic
controls, rupture of metal reaction vessels, etc.) catastrophe can result." Id. at 211.
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tory control devices12 within a framework of ongoing staff analysis and
funding for the investigation and monitoring of problems. The assump-
tion of most commentators is that creation of a new regulatory body, or
expanding the powers of an existing one, offers the optimal means of
controlling novel hazards in areas of uncertainty. 2 Legislatures, how-
ever, as the history of congressional involvement in the recombinant
DNA controversy indicates, are subject to a range of problems when
contemplating such complex regulatory tasks. They are typically reluc-
tant to innovate except where public pressure is strong. 30 They are
poorly equipped to obtain, understand, and use current scientific infor-
mation. 31 They may enact inappropriate legislation, based upon regu-
latory models that do not suit the risks at issue. 32 Most important, as
the recombinant DNA case illustrates, they may choose not to act, in
128 See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure Mismatches, Less Restric-
tive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 547 (1979); Cranston, Reform
Through Legislation: The Dimension of Legislative Technique, 73 Nw. L. REv. 873
(1978); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1263-77 (1981).
129 See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative: to
Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1871, 1874-75 (1981). The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) is currently moving to regulate products of genetic engi-
neering, such as pesticides produced by genetic engineering techniques. Given uncertain
legislative authority for such regulation, however, manufacturers are likely to litigate
EPA's authority. Sun, EPA Revs Up to Regulate Biotechnology, 222 ScI. 823 (1983). A
recent legal analysis of current federal agency authority to regulate genetic technologies
has concluded that while the various statutes probably give the EPA authority to ac-
quire information as to risks of industrial use of genetic engineering technologies, the
best solution would be a new statute specifically addressing the new genetic technolo-
gies. See McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36
VAND. L. REV. 461, 537-39 (1983). The authors conclude:
EPA, OSHA, and FDA have a wide array of regulatory authorities avail-
able to address those potential dangers. A court, however, may limit
EPA's authority by determining that the genetically altered DNA in a
mirco-organism is not a chemical substance. To ensure against this possi-
bility, Congress could amend the TSCA to give EPA explicit authority to
address the infective risks of new biotechnologies. Congress also should
appropriate to the relevant agencies adequate resources to implement their
data gathering and risk assessment functions. Without monetary and per-
sonnel resources, the regulatory agencies simply will not accomplish these
important objectives, and they will have lost the opportunity to oversee the
unfolding of the dramatic new genetic engineering technologies.
Id. at 540.
130 See Dienes, Judges Legislators, and Social Change, 13 AM. BEHAV. SCIEN-
TIST 511 (1970).
131 See Yellin, supra note 4, at 551.
1S2 Consider, for example, Senator Kennedy's proposed legislation regulating re-
combinant DNA, incorporating an OSHA-style inspection system, coupled with licens-
ing. See Recombinant DNA Safety Regulation Act, S. 1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1977). For criticism, see Szybalski, Much Ado About Recombinant DNA Regulations,
in BIOMEDICAL SCIENTIsTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 97 (H. Fudenberg & V. Melnick eds.
1978).
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the face of complex issues and forceful lobbying by the affected interest
groups.133 The creation of a new government agency dedicated to polic-
ing scientific research, not just for laboratory safety but for control over
uncertain risks, is not an attractive proposition, either to the scientific
community or to critics of the costs and inefficiencies of federal
regulation.
Even assuming Congress could enact an appropriate, comprehen-
sive administrative scheme, however, problems would remain. Agencies
tend to have a highly focused perspective and set of biases. One does
not have to accept the notion of agency "capture" wholeheartedly to be
uncomfortable with agencies like NIH handling the drafting and pro-
mulgation of regulations for scientific research.13 4 An agency committed
to an important scientific and technological goal cannot be expected to
strike the proper balance between safety and progress. Support and
promotion of the research by an agency leads inevitably to "the vesting
of professional, as well as of economic, interests in the application and
exploitation of that technology."13 5 A new regulatory framework, even
if it could pass muster in the current political climate, carries with it
the biases and rigidities that inevitably accompany a new bureaucracy
devoted to policing a particular technology.
6. The Public Control Model
Use of negotiated rules has been suggested as a means of ensuring
interest representation, relying on the views of parties directly affected
by the potential rules of an agency. As the advocate of such a model
contends, "if negotiators effectively represent all interests, negotiation
should make the administrative process more democratic while enhanc-
ing regulatory efficiency. By inviting affected groups to negotiate rules,
the agency would create a social microcosm, replicating the interest bal-
ancing process that underlies current rulemaking procedures." 3 ' A
novel and promising suggestion, it presumes an existing agency struc-
ture, and its sole reform goal is to enhance the representational nature
of that agency's decisionmaking.
133 See L. CAVALIERI, supra note 74, at 110-27.
134 See Chargaff, On the Dangers of Genetic Meddling, 192 Sci. 939 (1976).
135 Bereano, Recombinant DNA: Issues on the Regulation of Basic Scientific Re-
search, 20 IDEA 315, 322 (1981).
13I Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiations as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1871, 1874-75 (1981).
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7. The Elitist Judicial Oversight Model
Federal court oversight of agency decisionmaking provides what
can be viewed as a separate model. Such processes of judicial review
vary depending upon the congressional mandate given to the particular
agency whose regulations are under scrutiny. In the environmental
area, the "hard look" doctrine1 7 has led courts persistently to demand
reasoned decisionmaking by administrative agencies in which an agency
discloses information gaps, value choices, and assumptions. An agency
also may be compelled to undertake further effort to address weak-
nesses, as by gathering further data on a central issue. Critics of judi-
cial review of complex scientific controversies have pointed out that
courts are ill-equipped to conduct such review. A significant number of
judicial errors are evident, for example, in nuclear power review
cases. 38 One critic, Joel Yellin, has proposed a committee of standing
masters, a high technology review panel, to assist courts reviewing
agency decisions in areas of technological complexity, such as in envi-
ronmental and energy matters-"a body within the judiciary specially
constructed to provide reasoned second opinions responsive to the spe-
cial nature of modern environmental issues."'3 9 Federal courts could
refer complex questions to the standing masters, a committee of scien-
tists, engineers and lawyers. Yellin's proposal, drawn from the lessons
and failures of nuclear power regulation, involves a two-step process.
In the first step, the judge requests from the masters information on
technical issues. The masters would make findings, which would then
be reviewed by the court. The second step is "designed to elicit the
broader societal implications of proposed technological programs or reg-
ulation. 1 40 Unresolved questions apparent on the administrative record
would be examined in light of the scientific and engineering literature,
and members of the professional communities would be invited for con-
sultation. Yellin's goal is to set up a dialogue between the scientific
community and the courts, by which a body of knowledge will develop
in complex issues to help courts resolve environmental controversies.
A committee of standing masters, as an adjunct to courts reviewing
agency decisionmaking in areas of scientific controversy, would provide
137 The phrase "hard look" originated with Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 444 F. 2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). For an analytical discussion, see Rodgers, A Hard
Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J.
699, 705-09 (1979).
8 See id.
189 Yellin, supra note 4, at 554.
140 Id. at 556.
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a valuable reform. Like the negotiated-rules model, however, Yellin's
proposal cannot solve the problems with which this article is concerned,
because it presupposes the existence of an agency with the jurisdiction,
and the capacity, to control novel, emerging hazards.
8. Conclusion
None of the models discussed above is ideally suited for a new
hazard in an area of uncertainty, nor are the more effective possibilities
likely to come into being in the foreseeable future. A public nuisance
model, drawing upon existing norms and legal rules, may best serve the
function of both technology-assessment and technology-governance.
Considering the four goals by which institutional mechanisms must be
measured-checking momentum, counteracting bias, generating infor-
mation, and promoting public participation-a private litigation model
provides the best prospects for investigating new hazards, resolving
questions of the extent of the harm posed, and controlling the conduct
of the research.
III. PUBLIC RISKS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: REVIVING THE
COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE ENTITLEMENTS
The choice of means for governing novel hazards arising out of
scientific research requires a complex comparison of the relative
strengths of alternative regulatory models. The assumption of most
commentators has been that a new regulatory body offers the optimal
solution. There is little reason to believe, however, that Congress could
act to regulate research hazards effectively. On the other hand, there
are many reasons to believe that a private law model can fill the pres-
ent regulatory vacuum.
A private law model can draw on established norms-entitlements
to be free from "dread," or- fear of catastrophic outcomes. A court's
consideration of a problem, and articulation of applicable private
norms, may change social perceptions of the problem's nature and seri-
ousness. The equitable powers available to a judge superintending com-
plex public actions provide the possibility of flexible remedies, after the
threshold issue of the violation of a legally cognizable right has been
found. These powers allow circumvention of the objection in private
litigation that an unconditional injunction does too much, too fast; they
draw upon a tradition in tort law which recognizes the value of condi-
tional injunctions and flexible supervisory controls over hazardous ac-
tivities, upon an emerging consensus on the range of powers available
to the trial judge, and upon a recognition that a process of negotiation
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is occurring. The judiciary has a comparative advantage over other in-
stitutions, existing and proposed, given the goals which technology as-
sessment seeks to achieve. Judicial intervention in new hazards of re-
search is analogous to administrative licensing, where potential danger
is often cited as justification for licensing activities as diverse as nuclear
installations and medical devices.141 Private litigation can be a form of
prior approval required of an activity which is novel and not yet subject
to government regulation. The relative freedom of the courts from
short-term political pressures gives them a unique perspective from
which to gauge the long-term risks and implications of major new de-
velopments,142 without the unique problems associated with administra-
tive agencies.' 43
Nuisance law recently has undergone a minor renaissance in envi-
ronmental law. Federal courts have acknowledged the existence of a
federal common law of nuisance which can be invoked by a private
litigant.144 Commentators have advocated further development of the
common law of nuisance at both the state and federal levels to bring
standards for the issuance of injunctions into line with analogous legis-
lation governing areas such as toxic substances. 45 Private nuisance ac-
tions have been conceded to have an important residual role in environ-
mental land-use decisionmaking,' 4" as reflected in liberalized standing
141 See Cranston, supra note 128, at 901.
142 See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 248 (1973).
145 See Casper, Technology Policy and Democracy, 194 Sci. 29 (1976).
144 See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1980), holding that the common law nuisance remedy recognized in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) would apply, recognizing the Restatement of
Torts formulation of a public nuisance as an appropriate source for the federal rule.
However, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced federal com-
mon law, severely restricting the extent to which private rights can be derived from
federal statutes. While a body of federal common law still exists, it cannot be expanded
to effectuate federal interests absent a clear expression of Congressional intent in the
statute from which the alleged federal right is claimed. See, e.g., Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979). The Supreme Court has in effect created a presumption against
judicial recognition of private rights, so that it is unlikely that the federal common law
of nuisance can be expanded based on federal legislation dealing with the environment
or other areas.
145 See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L.
REv. 584, 593-96 (1981).
148 See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1585 (1978);
see also Bryson & Macbeath, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972); Grad & Rockett, Environmental
Litigation-Where the Action Is?, 10 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 742 (1970); McLaren, The
Common Law Nuisance Action and the Environmental Battle: Well-Tempered Swords
or Broken Reeds?, 10 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 505 (1972); Schuck, Air Pollution as a
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requirements allowing a private party to sue to vindicate public
rights.147 The criticisms leveled against reliance upon a common law
nuisance model for more than interstitial gap-filling are fundamentally
criticisms of the limitations of a court, or of the adversary system, in
responding to certain classes of problems. For reasons discussed in the
previous section, however, such criticisms do not apply to the problem
of technology assessment and control.
A. The Nature of Nuisance
Nuisance law has suffered from neglect in the area of technologi-
cal risk. It has come to be viewed as little more than a historical source
of ideas useful in establishing administrative risk-assessment proce-
dures, a way station on the path to public regulation.1 48 Nuisance law
goes back to medieval English law which as early as the sixteenth cen-
tury recognized the desirability of specific relief against nuisances, often
those presenting public health problems. The English writs spoke of
"filthinesses which are in the ways and lanes of the said city and the
suburbs thereof, the air there is so much corrupted and infected, that a
dreadful terror strikes the masters and scholars. 14  The realm of the
nuisance action, one historian noted, was the "stinking privy, the fouled
or diverted stream, the polluting chimney."' 50 Historically, nuisance
law provided a tool for relieving actual or threatened noxious uses of
land in the vicinity of plaintiff landowners."" It was a device for strik-
ing land-use bargains, a town-planning device152 prior to the emergence
of zoning laws. Before 1750, suits were often aimed at mismanagement
of time-honored occupations, such as the giant piggery in the Boston
Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW 475 (1970); Warren, Nuisance Law as an
Environmental Tool, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 211 (1971).
147 See Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAw AND ENVIRONMENT
123 (U. Baldwin ed. 1970); see also state statutes such as MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1982), which abolish traditional standing requirements
and allow any citizen to sue, and which authorize judicial creation of a substantive
common law of environmental quality. See generally infra note 233 and accompanying
text.
149 See, e.g., Yellin, supra note 4, at 981-85.
149 Fitz-Herbert, New Natura Brevium, 185 D, Writs of Nuisance which are
Vicontiel (Before 1537), quoted in Z. CHAFfE, JR. & E. RE, Qurr" 716 5th ed.,
1967.
150 Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 403,
403 (1974).
a'1 See, e.g., Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1207 (1934) (industrial plant); 86 A.L.R. 998
(1933) (bakery); Annot., 50 A.L.R. 107 (1927) (garage); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 518 (1927)
(pesthouse); Annot., 33 A.L.R. 725 (1924) (amusement park). See generally Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1973).
152 See Ellickson, supra note 151.
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suburbs producing a smell like "the odor of one pig multiplied five
hundred times. " 153 During the last two centuries, nuisance cases in
both England and America arose during transitional stages between
older community arrangements and emerging industries. The industrial
revolution spawned nuisance litigation by farmers and homeowners on
the troubled frontier of new technologies against textile mills, blast fur-
naces, hydraulic mines, and cement plants.1" Nuisance law was also
used to control "immoral" uses such as movie theatres.1 55 It was a
means of restricting "upsetting" institutions, such as tuberculosis
santoriums, which created a sense of unease among neighbors,15 and it
restricted the operation of potentially catastrophic activities, such as the
storage or use of explosive materials, even when the probability of
harm was slight.
1 57
Nuisances are classified as public or private.1 58 A private nuisance
was early defined as an annoyance that interferes with the ability of
another to use or enjoy his land, 5 9 with depreciation in the value of the
property the measure of present damages.1 60 The concept of legal in-
jury expanded beyond the traditional injury to property as it became
apparent to the courts that some losses could not be stated in terms of
market value.' 1 In nuisance law, as in other areas of law, the concept
of injury came to encompass not only harm to ownership interest, but
also to state of mind.1 62 Thus, a nuisance may cause interference by
153 Commonwealth v. Perry, 139 Mass. 198, 200, 29 N.E. 656 (1885) (words not
reported in unofficial reporter).
154 See Z. CHAFEE AND E. RE, supra note 149, at 769 n.69 (list of activities
which the plaintiff sought to enjoin included barking dogs, popcorn stands, supermar-
kets, backyard barbecues, prefabricated houses, and libraries in residential areas).
155 For a thorough discussion, see Rendeman, Civilizing Pornography: The Case
for An Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 509 (1977).
1 See, e.g.,. Statler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 998 (1910); Brink v. Shep-
ard, 215 Mich. 390, 184 N.W. 404 (1921); Birchard v. Board of Health, 204 Mich.
284, 169 N.W. 901 (1918); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910).
157 Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923);
Whittemore v. Baxter Laundry Co., 181 Mich. 564, 148 N.W. 437 (1914).
I See generally Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV.
997, 997-99 (1966).
159 Id.
160 See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMnDirs_ 332-35
(1973).
161 See, e.g., Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E. 2d 241 (1946).
See generally W. PnossER, LAW OF TORTS 591-93 (4th ed. 1971); J. VINING, LEGAL
IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 32 (1978); Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1979); Developments in the
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 998-1001 (1965)..
162 Some nuisance decisions specifically acknowledged that mental disturbance or
psychic injuries caused by a private or public nuisance might be actionable at law or
equity, most clearly in cases involving funeral parlors or crematoriums. See,, e.g., State
v. Feezell, 218 Tenn. 17, 20, 400 S.W.2d 716, 719 (1966) ("We do not say that mental
1983]
1440 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1403
physically invading another person's land, but fear of future harm may
also be sufficient to establish a nuisance.' 63
A public nuisance has been defined as an interference with "a
right common to the general public."'" It affords recovery in damages
to individual plaintiffs only if they suffer "special damages" different
from those suffered by the general public. 65 A showing of special dam-
ages may not be necessary, however, if the plaintiff seeks only injunc-
tive relief and otherwise has standing to sue.16 6 Personal discomfort or
disturbances or "psychic" injuries caused by a nuisance, public or private, are not such
as may be actionable at law or equity. They can, in fact, be very real to the complain-
ants."). See also Annot. 39 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1001, 1022-26 (1965):
If an undertaking establishment in a purely residential section causes,
from its normal operations, depressing feelings to families in the immedi-
ate neighborhood, and, as a constant reminder of death, appreciably im-
pairs their happiness or weakens their powers of resistance and depreci-
ates the value of their properties, such an establishment constitutes a
nuisance.
Id. at 1001.
Anticipatory injunctions against fear-inducing activities became more difficult to
obtain, however, as municipal zoning ordinances supplanted private remedies. The na-
ture of the fear-producing institutions also changed. Half-way houses replaced sanitaria
as the source of neighborhood anxiety, and courts began to reject fear or apprehension
as the basis for recovery when based upon "speculation" that the residents of the half-
way houses would commit criminal acts. One senses in these more recent cases a judi-
cial hostility toward the prejudices which underlie such litigation. See, e.g., Nicholson
v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966), in which
the court denied relief to residents of a neighborhood in which a half-way house for
inmates from the Connecticut State Prison were to be placed: "This present fear of
what may happen in the future, although genuinely felt, rests completely on supposi-
tion. The anticipation by the plaintiffs of the possible consequences of the defendant's
proposed use of the property can be characterized as a speculative and intangible fear."
Id. at 511, 218 A.2d at 386.
16 See Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 154 F.2d 450,
453-54 (6th Cir.) (enjoining prospective mining operation that might destabilize a cliff
overhanging an active railroad track), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946); Henderson v.
Sullivan, 159 F. 46 (6th Cir. 1908) (partially enjoining dynamite storage); Tyner v.
The People's Gas Co., 131 Ind. 408, 31 N.E. 61 (1892) (enjoining storage and use of
nitrogylcerin in residential areas); Cheatham v. Shearon, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 213
(1851) (enjoining storage of gunpowder in city). See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nui-
sances § 147 (1971).
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
165 Whether a plaintiff's damages must be of a distinctly different kind to satisfy
the rule, or simply differ in degree, is still unclear. Prosser writes: "it is uniformly held
that a private individual has no action for the invasion of the purely public right unless
his damage is in some way to be distinguished from that sustained by other members of
the general public." W. PRossER, supra note 61, at 586. Personal injury or harm to
health, or mental distress, or any substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of his own land, has been enough to confer standing, since this makes the
nuisance private as well as public. However, the courts often constricted this notion of
"special injury" with a view to protecting industrial development. See generally Kurtz,
Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions-Avoiding the Chan-
cellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621, 666-67 (1976).
'" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979).
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illness may be sufficient to constitute special damages, and the effect
can be on an occupant or possessor of property as well as the owner.
Fear of future harm has been cited as one basis for standing to assert a
public nuisance."' 8
Nuisance law had a hard edge in that it often afforded relief with-
out any showing of negligence. Courts rejected defenses based upon
compliance with a standard of care and community benefit.1 69 Nuisance
law therefore might have played a powerful restraining role in the in-
dustrialization of both England and America. 70 It did not have such a
role, however, because of judicial sensitivity to economic develop-
ment.171 Entrepreneurs avoided injunctive relief by means of judicial
167 Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wash. 2d 346, 274 P.2d 574
(1954); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1307 (1943).
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment g (1979) ("thus the
threat of communication of smallpox to a single person may be enough to constitute a
public nuisance because of the possibility of an epidemic"); Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) ("personal stake" recognized
where the dispute involved a speculative, long-term prediction of harm).
16' See, e.g., McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952 (D.
Utah 1904).
170 See Brenner, supra note 163, at 403.
171 For a development of the thesis that judges altered nuisance law, as well as
other substantive doctrines, in the direction of economic subsidization, see M. HOR-
WlTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977). Horwitz notes
that while substantive tort doctrine remained plaintiff-oriented, "judges began to estab-
lish a variety of ingenious variations in its application that eventually transformed the
substantive doctrine itself." Id. at 76. These doctrinal changes were distinctive in light
of "the extent to which common law doctrines were transformed to create immunities
from legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for those who undertook
schemes of economic development." Id. at 99-100. But see Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717
(1981).
The history of nuisance doctrine in England is traced in Brenner, supra note 163.
Brenner notes that in the 1850's the law was invaded by a standard of care. It was
applied differently to factories than to private individuals, however, and was hardly
applied at all to quasi-public enterprises such as railways by reason of their statutory
authorization; there was no systematic prosecution of public nuisances; and a decline in
property values ceased to be sufficient proof-actual physical damage came to be re-
quired. "Damage to the occupier's health and comfort was no longer a property injury
per se. Since property values in the most contaminated areas often rose rather than fell
.. . unhealthy conditions were doubly excluded from the scope of a nuisance remedy."
Id. at 420.
The evolution of the American law of nuisance injunctions is traced in Kurtz,
supra note 165. Kurtz notes that since 1830 a range of procedural maxims and de-
fenses were developed to counteract the plaintiff-oriented substantive law. Thus, a long
and undisputed right must have been violated, requiring the plaintiff on occasion to sue
at law, prior to moving to equity. Most importantly, only actual not prospective nui-
sances could be enjoined. If a few other land owners were affected by the same nui-
sance as the plaintiff, then the private nuisances could be aggregated into a public
nuisance, and each would thereby lose standing to sue on a private nuisance theory. A
negligence standard and an industrialization defense were added, along with a balanc-
ing test. From 1871 to 1916, courts applied the balancing test to determine injunctive
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immunities and defenses.2
72
B. The Problem of Risk
The problem of relief from the risk of harm is one of the most
difficult issues in the law. Ordinarily, an actionable wrong occurs when
a person has suffered injury to person or property. But the risks created
by a bomb stored in an armory, or a laboratory engaging in research,
relief, weighing the probable effects on the plaintiff, the defendants, and the public.
Because the expenditures of entrepreneurs were normally significant in plant and
equipment, a balancing test operated like a presumption in favor of the defendant.
Some courts then used the balancing test to determine whether a nuisance in fact ex-
isted, rather than merely to assess the applicability of injunctive relief.
A minority rejected the balancing test. See Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co.,
208 N.Y. 1, 2, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913) ("although the damage to the plaintiff may be
slight as compared with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a
good reason for refusing an injunction"). Normally, however, public benefit was con-
sidered in light of the defendant's operation, the likely hardship the parties would suf-
fer if the operation is or is not enjoined, and the equities between the parties, in terms
of misconduct or bad faith. See, e.g., Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir.
1927); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). See
generally D. DOBBS, supra note 160, at 357-58 (1973). Whalen was restricted, or
abandoned, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). The general position seems to be that hardships should be
balanced.
172 Defenses against nuisance actions based on zoning, statutory authorizations,
and other governmental actions have only a restricted operation. Thus it is clear that a
zoning ordinance permitting an activity generally is not a defense. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 160, at 363; Comment, Real Property-The Effect of Zoning Ordinances
on the Law of Nuisance, 54 MicH. L. REv. 266, 270-71 (1955). A minority rule bars
an injunction, however, if the activity is authorized by a zoning ordinance. See D.
DOBBS, supra note 160, at 363; see also Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. 236 App.
Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932), where both damage and injunction were denied be-
cause of a zoning authorization.
The notion of "legalized nuisance," a second defense, provided an immunity for an
activity conducted within statutory limits. Thus, "[w]here the Legislature has author-
ized an act, such act cannot constitute a public nuisance although it would otherwise be
such, so long as the terms of the authorization are not abused or exceeded." Borough of
Collegeville v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 377 Pa. 636, 655, 105 A.2d 722, 731
(1954). See also Mayor of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co, 87 Md. 352, 39 A.
1081 (1898). However, major interference cannot be authorized, Richards v. Washing-
ton Terminal Co. 233 U.S. 546 (1914); W. PitossER, supra note 161, at 606-07. A
license or statutory authorization does not carry with it protection for risks if a nui-
sance is created. Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1960).
Even if the authorization is liberally construed, it will not cover risks other than those
to which it is addressed. Thus in Commonwealth v. Kidder, 107 Mass. 188 (1871), a
statute allowing gasoline storage if appropriate fire precautions were taken did not
immunize the activity from nuisance liability due to odors.
Compliance with government safety and health requirements by laboratory or in-
dustry is not a bar to an award of actual or punitive damages, although it may be some
evidence of reasonable conduct in a suit based on negligence. Cf Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984) (compli-
ance with government safety regulations for nuclear facility).
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do not fit such a pattern. What types of risks are so serious that they
constitute a tort for which injunctive relief can be granted before a spe-
cific member of the public suffers injury to person or property? Criteria
for deciding when a risk becomes actionable may be derived through an
analysis of the various doctrinal bases of tort liability.
1. Considerations of Risk in Tort and Equity
Negligence is the standard of liability imposed on persons engaged
in activities with respect to which a moderate level of risk is accepted.
Thus, a clear spectrum of risks presented by the act of driving an auto-
mobile is assumed by the general public. One who drives at 100 miles
per hour or fails to pay attention while driving, however, has deviated
from a standard level of acceptable conduct and must bear the responsi-
bility for any harm resulting from the unreasonable risk.
178
In nuisance actions it is not always necessary to prove negligence.
Those engaged in "abnormally dangerous" activities are held strictly
liable for the damage which results.'7 4 Probability of harm is one ele-
ment courts will consider when deciding whether an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous. Many dangerous activities, however, do not present a
strong probability of mishap,15 but rather a potentially catastrophic
17S See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 H~Auv. L. REv. 537, 548
(1972).
174 The Restatement lists six factors relevant to the determination of an activity as
abnormally dangerous:
a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
0 extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its danger-
ous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
It has been noted that the application of these factors to a possible recombinant
DNA injury is uncertain, and one commentator has proposed federal legislation to clar-
ify this uncertainty. See Friedman, Health Hazards Associated With Recombinant
DNA Technology: Should Congress Impose Liability Without Fault?, 51 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1355 (1978). The term "abnormally dangerous" was substituted for the term
"ultrahazardous" in the second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
App. §§ 519, 520 (1981). An "ultrahazardous activity" was defined in the first Restate-
ment as one which: "(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land
or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1934).
175 Harry Kalven has noted that "one suspects that the extra hazardous activities
of the popular mind, like flying airplanes, using explosives, and utilizing nuclear en-
ergy are probably unusually safe because of the expertise with which they are han-
dled." Kalven, Tort Law-Tort Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL LAW. 1, 43 (1972) (footnote
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consequence. Blasting, 7" storing of munitions,7 damming large bodies
of water,178 and transporting petroleum 7 9 are among the activities
which may not present a strong likelihood of harm but have been found
to constitute nuisances. In such cases the courts are likely to focus on
the nature of the possible consequences, rather than on the probability
that injury to person or property will occur."' 0
At one time some courts would enjoin any activity found to be a
nuisance,""' but today most courts will issue an injunction only after a
specific finding that the social utility of the nuisance is outweighed by
the injury it causes. 8 2 Thus, activities to which strict liability attaches
are two kinds. Some are "reasonable," in that we value the activity
sufficiently so that we do not prohibit it, but rather insist on compensa-
tion for the resulting injuries. A smaller category, "unreasonable" ac-
tivities, presents intolerable risks and is subject to injunction. 83
Singling out a category of risks, the consequence of which are to
be borne strictly by those who create them, has been justified in'two
ways. George Fletcher postulates that the level of risk presented by
activities that give rise to strict liability exceeds that level of risk which
the parties have mutually-albeit tacitly-agreed to accept. Activities
which impose grave hazards on a community stand out, creating
"threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which all members of
omitted).
16 See Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31 (1969); Gossett v.
Southern Ry. Co., 115 Tenn. 376, 89 S.W. 737 (1905).
177 See Heeg v. Licht, 80 N.Y. 579 (1880).
178 See Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868 L.R. 3, H.L. 330; W. PRossER, supra note 161,
at 505-14.
17 See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1973).
8' See, e.g., Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 154 F.2d
450, 453 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946), in which the court declared:
It may be that . . .disaster could occur only upon a concatenation of
circumstances of not too great probability. . . . It is common experience,
however, that catastrophes occur at unexpected times and in unforeseen
places .... A court of equity will not gamble with human life, at
whatever odds, and for loss of life there is no remedy that in an equitable
sense is adequate.
181 See Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
183 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970)
(awarding damages but denying injunctive relief against cement plant). In addition, the
plaintiff must show that adequate alternative legal remedies are not available, and that
the injury to be avoided is irreparable. See, e.g., Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 668
(D.D.C. 1978) (denying injunctive relief against the conduct of recombinant DNA re-
search at the government laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland); see also Commerce
Oil Refinery Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465, 474 (1st Cir. 1969); W. PRoSSER, supra
note 175, at 603-04; Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 176, at 996-
98, 1001-06 & 1013-14 (1965); Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A Need for Re-
form, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1031-37 (1972).
183 See Fletcher, supra note 173.
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the community contribute in roughly equal shares."' " Such risks ex-
ceed those which one would reasonably expect to incur, "relative to the
background of innocuous risks in the community.""8 5 Thus, one is held
strictly liable for the consequences of those activities which subject
members of a community "to a risk to which they were unaccustomed
and which they would not regard as a tolerable risk entailed by their
way of life."""6 Many activities, however, such as the normal operation
of heavy industry, small businesses, and research laboratories, may at
times impose a different kind and degree of risk than those regularly
encountered by most individuals. We do not impose strict liability as a
prima facie matter on all activities simply on the ground that the pre-
sent risks differ from the normal, "innocuous" risks created by the ma-
jority of individuals living in a community. The theory seems more ap-
propriate to an earlier time of less fluid community memberships and
stronger norms of custom and tradition. 87 Hazards could be more eas-
ily differentiated by comparison to standard community practices: the
domestic dog compared to the pet lion, for example, or the automobile
in 1905 to the carriage.
Guido Calabresi provides a different rationale. 88 Strict liability
guarantees vigilance in the reduction of risks 8 ' by placing the burden
on the party with the best access to information and the means to im-
plement changes. Thus, persons in a position to reduce the risks that
they create must assume the consequences of those risks. Only they can
"be looked to for advances in safety technology or other adjustments
that minimize accident costs."190 This justification has a sense of fair-
ness about it, as well as economic merit.
A possible difficulty with this cost-avoidance theory is its crude-
ness. Since manufacturers, universities, and owners of sports arenas or
ice skating rinks will almost always have better access to information
than those affected, the theory seems to dictate that liability will always
fall on the institution. Distinctions among categories of hazards are not
184 Id. at 547.
185 Id. at 549.
188 Id. at 545.
18" As Fletcher admits, "the increased complexity and interdependence of modern
society renders legal analysis based upon a concept of community that presupposes
clear lines of membership, relatively little overlapping, and a fair degree of uniformity
in the activities carried on, exceedingly difficult in many cases." Id. at 549 n.46 (cita-
tion omitted).
18 G. CALABRESI, supra note 114; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
189 Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54
S. CAL. L. Rv. 1, 11 (1980).
190 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140 (2d ed. 1977).
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important, nor are the relationships of risks to those affected by them
or to the community in which they are created; only the relative abili-
ties of the parties to assess and alter risks are considered.
It may be that in some strict liability situations, such as the classic
blasting example, both a normative theory of reciprocal risks and an
economic theory of cost avoidance offer complementary explanations." 1
In both the normative and the economic approaches, there is a notion of
the relative ability of the parties to ascertain risks and protect against
them. In a blasting case, for example, when a contractor selects blasting
as a preferred means of excavation in a residential area, he has decided
to promote his own goals at the expense of the neighborhood, thereby
subjecting the residents to an unexpected level of hazard to which they
would not have agreed and against which they can not easily take pre-
cautions. It can also be said that he is in the best position to assess such
risks and should be held liable in order to be forced to consider safety
in selecting his means of excavation.
The risks associated with activities for which injunctive relief is
appropriate pose a problem for the principal justifications of strict lia-
bility. In these cases damage relief is typically inadequate because the
harm has not yet materialized. The harm threatened may effect wide-
spread social disruption, health problems, or often irreversible ecologi-
cal damage. Neither the degree of precautions taken nor the remoteness
of the harm is relevant. 192 We can easily identify the owner of the nui-
sance as the cheaper cost-avoider as between the parties, yet a decision
is made that strict liability is an inadequate means of regulation-that
the risks aren't worth taking in their present form.
Philosophers have long searched for principles to justify coercive
intervention by the state. A basic justification is to alleviate reasonable
fears of members of a community.' Different levels of intervention
may address different types of fears.'' Assurance of compensation, for
example, provides an adequate response to the threat that one's prop-
erty may get damaged. The prospects of catastrophe or of assault by
another give rise to a more pervasive kind of fear, one requiring a
higher level of intervention. Such general fear, or dread, is not assuaged
, Calabresi and Hirschoff, however, suggest that the normative theory is merely
an approximation of the cost-avoidance analysis. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note
188, at 1079.
'"See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
, This theory is developed in R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974). See also Drane & Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime Distinc-
tion, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398 (1980).
I" R. NozIcK, supra note 193, at 65-66; Dane & Neal, supra note 193, at 409-
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by the compensation of the individual. Robert Nozick develops this dis-
tinction as a means of distinguishing between "private wrongs," for
which compensation is adequate, and "public wrongs," which must be
prohibited."' 5 He writes: "Thus the prohibition against fear-producing
acts is not addressed to the fear of a person who is actually injured.
That fear could be compensated. Rather, it seeks to protect the other
members of society from the fear that they will suffer if such actions
are allowed subject to the requirements of compensation.""" It is in
part the individual's knowledge that the state allows such acts that
causes the fear. Although Nozick contrasts damages in tort only with
criminal sanctions, his argument applies equally to the problem of un-
reasonable risks. Public dread is increasingly the by-product of new,
highly sophisticated research activities, partially as a reaction to the un-
certain nature of the risks, and partially because the known possibilities
include irreversible, intergenerational catastrophe.'"
The concept of dread has served to define the boundaries of nui-
sance law. It has been used in cases involving activities which subject
neighbors to a fear of harm transcending concerns over diminution of
property values. In Everett v. Paschall," s the plaintiffs sought injunc-
tive relief against a tuberculosis sanitarium. Tuberculosis at this time
was the cause of one-seventh of the deaths in the United States and was
therefore widely feared, although scientists testified that it was not con-
tagious beyond three feet when proper public health measures were
followed.199 The plaintiffs' property values were shown to have been
reduced by one-third to one-half by the presence of the sanitarium and
the resulting fear on the part of the neighborhood. The court focused
on the role of fear in nuisance cases:
If dread of the disease and fear induced by the proximity of
the sanitarium, in fact, disturb the comfortable enjoyment of
the property of the appellants, we question our right to say
that the fear is unfounded or unreasonable, when it is shared
by the whole public to such an extent that property values
are diminished. The question is, not whether the fear is
founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether it is
imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects the move-
195 R. NozicK, supra note 193, at 67.
10 Id.
197 See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Per-
ceived Risk, in SociETAL RISK ASSESSMENT How SAFE Is SAFE ENOUGH? (R. Schw-
ing & W. Albers eds. 1980).
108 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910).
id. at 48, 111 P. at 880.
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ments and conduct of men. Such fears are actual, and must
be recognized by the courts as other emotions of the human
mind.200
The court further noted that public health measures were required
to ensure against contagion of tuberculosis, and "aside from the general
dread of the disease . . . it is also known that the security of the public
depends upon proper precautions and sanitation, which may at any
time be relaxed by incautious nurses or ignorant patients."201 The
court remanded the case and ordered injunctive relief granted. In Ever-
ett v. Paschall, the dread was not unreasonable, for scientific testimony
indicated a risk of contagion.20 2 It simply was impossible to compensate
someone for the fear resulting from this uncertainty, 0 3 and the court
200 Id. at 50-51, 111 P. at 882.
201 Id. at 52-53, 111 P. at 883.
202 The courts split over the issue of whether injunctive relief is available against
hospitals treating diseases whose communicability is uncertain. In Stotler v. Rochelle,
83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 788 (1910), the court enjoined the construction of a cancer hospital
in a residential neighborhood. Contradictory evidence had been presented on the ques-
tion of communicability. The court concluded:
In the present state of accurate knowledge on the subject, it is quite within
bounds to say that, whether or not there is actual danger of the transmis-
sion of the disease under the conditions stated, the fear of it is not entirely
unreasonable ...
The question is not whether the establishment of the hospital would
place the occupants of the adjacent dwellings in actual danger of infection,
but whether they would have reasonable ground to fear such a result, and
whether, in view of the general dread inspired by the disease, the reasona-
ble enjoyment of their property would not be materially interfered with by
the bringing together of a considerable number of cancer patients in this
place. However carefully the hospital might be conducted, and however
worthy the institution might be, its mere presence, which would necessa-
rily be manifested in various ways, would make the neighborhood less de-
sirable for residence purposes, not to the oversensitive alone, but to per-
sons of normal sensibilities.
Id. at 91-92, 109 P. at 793. See also Birchard v. Board of Health of City of Lansing,
204 Mich. 284, 169 N.W. 901 (1918) (enjoining public hospital for treatment of infec-
tious disease as a nuisance, based on neighbors' fear).
In Cook v. City of Fall River, 239 Mass. 90, 131 N.E. 346 (1921), the court
refused to enjoin a tuberculosis hospital as a nuisance since "it is not to be assumed in
advance that such a hospital, well equipped and managed under the supervision of
public health boards, will be a nuisance. Whatever danger of infection there may be
will be no greater to [this] neighborhood ...than [to another]." Id. at 93, 131
N.E. at 345.
3 The concept of dread became a central issue in litigation over the Three Mile
Island nuclear failure. In People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm., 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983), the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that in determining whether
the nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island should be restarted, the psychological
health and well-being of the community must be considered under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976), in connection with an
GOVERNING SCIENCE
acted accordingly.
2. The Elements of Risk
Risk has two components: the severity of threatened harm, and the
probability of its occurrence.2 °4 In evaluating various ways of reducing
risk, the potential harm must first be identified, and then its probability
estimated. These steps comprise the expected utility model for rational
decisionmaking, adopted by Learned Hand for the purpose of defining
negligent conduct. 05 Hand compared risk (R), which he defined as the
product of the probability and the severity of threatened harm (P x S),
with the cost of avoiding the hazard (c). When faced with a choice, the
rational decisionmaker will prefer the prospect that offers the lowest
costs or the highest expected utility. Refinements of this formula pro-
vide the basis for much government decisionmaking, with modifications
to include second order consequences such as the effect of precautions
on a consumer product market. °8
a. Limits in Determining Probability
Probabilities pose a complicated problem of assessment because
they may be subjective as well as objective. Objective probabilities are
Environmental Impact Statement. "NEPA does not encompass mere dissatisfactions
arising from social opinions, economic concerns, or political disagreements with agency
policies. It does apply to post-traumatic anxieties, accompanied by physical effects and
caused by fears of recurring catastrophe." Id. at 230. The concerns of the lower court
echoed the earlier refrains of the nuisance cases in recognizing the special status of
individual and community dread in the face of potentially catastrophic events.
The United States Supreme Court then reversed the D.C. Circuit in a unanimous
decision based upon the Court's reading of "environmental" in NEPA as applying only
to the physical environment. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, concluded: "But
a risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical environment." 103 S. Ct. at 1556.
Given the kind of psychological evidence that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
would have had to generate and evaluate in order to determine impact, the Supreme
Court was obviously worried about the strain on the NRC's limited resources. "The
available resources may be spread so thin that agencies are unable adequately to pursue
protection of the physical environment and natural resources." Id. The Supreme
Court's concerns are clearly inappropriate, since the disaster at Three Mile Island is
uniquely traumatic, and it is unlikely that regulatory agencies will regularly be con-
fronted with such novel events. The conceptual validity of the inclusion of psychological
stress, of "dread," within the meaning of NEPA, remains convincing.
204 See generally W. RowE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977).
205 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
06 The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, undertakes in regu-
lating hazardous consumer products to evaluate the nature and severity of the risk, the
efficacy of a proposed standard in reducing the severity or frequency of injury, and the
effect of the standard on the utility, cost, or availability of the product. This approach
appears to follow from the language of the court in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v.
Consumer Product Safety Comm., 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
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those we can determine using direct empirical evidence. If we want to
know how likely it is that a specific weakened host E. coli strain of
bacteria can survive passage through the human intestine, we can cre-
ate the necessary circumstances to conduct a test.20 The probability of
a concatenation of events leading to a disaster, on the other hand, can-
not be estimated through experiments. Similarly, the putative benefits
of an activity, such as the prospects of finding a cure for cancer posed
by a line of research, cannot be gathered from empirical testing. "Sub-
jective" probabilities must be assigned in such a case. But whose subjec-
tive probabilities ought to be used in making the decision? Experts in
the area are an obvious choice, but expertise may blend with biases in
favor of the activity under consideration. 0 8 The choice of probabilities
inevitably reflects a political as well as an expert viewpoint.2 °9 A sec-
ond problem in assigning probabilities arises when we find it difficult
to conceptualize the possible consequences. Where the hazards are new,
they may be only dimly perceived. The hazards of rare events may be
ignored simply because they are difficult to imagine or do not come to
mind.210 The very novelty of a new hazard denies us readily available
analogies, which can result in complacency. A state of overconfidence
207 Stich, The Recombinant DNA Debate: Some Philosophical Considerations in
THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE 191 (D. Jackson & S. Stich eds. 1979).
'18 See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
209 In Holliday, Should Genetic Engineers Be Contained?, 73 NEw Sci. 399
(1977) subjective assessments are assigned to the variables needed to culminate in a
range of catastrophic consequences including various epidemics and death by cancer. By
assigning each variable an independent probability and then multiplying them, a small
cumulative probability for an accident was derived. Holliday wrote: "[tihe cumulative
values above represent extraordinary small probabilities. Thus, if 10 scientists in each
of 100 laboratories carried out 100 experiments per year, the least serious accident...
would occur on average once in a million years." Id. at 401.
Others have disputed his assignments of probabilities, which Holliday admitted
were subjective. A fundamental criticism is that he ignored other pathways with higher
probabilities of outcome. In a paper criticizing Holliday's analysis, a scientist in the
nuclear power industry wrote:
If we were proponents of Recombinant DNA research and wished to as-
sess negative outcomes most favorably to the continuance of such research,
what should our assessment strategy be? Perhaps a most effective strategy
would be to assume mechanisms with a large number of causal steps and
then to argue for low probabilities in as many as those steps as possible.
We should be stubbornly blind to any choice of mechanism which might
substantially reduce the size of the causal chain or increase any of the
individual probabilities.
S. Mackey, A Critique of Arguments Against Regulation of Recombinant DNA Re-
search (Spring, 1979) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also Kasper,
Perceptions of Risk and Their Effects on Decisionmaking in SOCIETAL RIsK AssEss-
MENT 76 (R. Schwing & W. Albers eds. 1980).
210 See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 197, at 181; Tversky &
Kahneman,Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974).
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often exists, preventing an awareness that additional information is
needed. We may therefore tend to underestimate the likelihood of
events which are hard to imagine, or which are outside of or remote
from our normal experience.2"' In evaluating the hazards of complex
systems, the probabilities of failure are often underestimated, as the in-
cident at Three Mile Island amply demonstrates. 2 '
Two additional psychological processes further tend to limit our
ability to assess the probability of outcomes. When communication
about a risk reaches a certain saturation point through media coverage
the individual will minimize or ignore the risk. Even though the prob-
lem remains, risk-aversion on an individual level may cease or may
shift toward a position of neutrality as a defense against the tension.213
A second psychological tendency, cognitive dissonance, 1 4 would affect
the judgment of those responsible for a risk-creating activity. Individual
researchers may attempt after a time to minimize internal conflict
about the hazards of their research by rationalizing questionable deci-
sions already made. As they commit themselves more deeply, they will
be motivated to believe that they have made the right choice.
b. Limits in Identifying Consequences
Given the difficulty in assigning probability values, the complaint
is often heard that the public tends to focus unduly on disastrous conse-
quences. 15 Such an emphasis is not irrational; it can be found in a line
of nuisance law decisions.21 6 The identification of possible consequences
does, however, pose serious problems for decisional theory.21 7
First, the calculation of the gravity of harm, measured by the
211 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIcA 263 (1979); Slovic, The Psychology of Protective Behavior, 10
J. SAFETY RESEARCH 58 (1978); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes
and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165 (J. Carroll & J.
Payne eds. 1976).
212 See generally THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: LESSONS AND
IMPLICATIONS (T. Moss & D. Sills eds. 1981), especially Jaffe, Technical Aspects and
Chronology of the Three Mile Island Accident, at 37.
21" This phenomenon has been described as the "boomerang effect." See H.
DENENBERG, R. EILERS, G. HOFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELONE & H. SNIDER, RISK
AND INSURANCE 62 (1964).
214 See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
215 "The notion of risk is an extraordinarily constructed idea, essentially decontex-
tualized and desocialized. Thinking about how to choose between risks, subjective val-
ues must have priority. It is a travesty of rational thought to pretend that it is best to
take value-free decisions in matters of life and death." M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAV-
SKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL DANGERS 73 (1982).
216 See supra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.
217 See W. RowE, supra note 204, at 152.
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number of individuals involved and the injuries suffered, cannot assume
an equivalence between x deaths, in separate unrelated episodes, spread
over time, and x deaths occuring roughly coincidentally as the result of
a single accident or catastrophe. Ten deaths from separate auto acci-
dents may not be as onerous as ten deaths from a single traffic pileup
during a storm. And the larger the numbers, the greater the disparity
between the episodic injuries and the catastrophic injuries.218 Cata-
strophic events may have effects beyond the sum of individual injuries
for several reasons. Social disruption may result if the damage exceeds
the limits of disaster relief organizations and loss-spreading insurance,
and if health care organizations are unable to deal with catastrophic
health problems. Psychological harm, including fear of future death or
illness due to long-term effects, may result. A catastrophic event, there-
fore, cannot be expressed in terms of the number of deaths and injuries
it produces. Second, irreversible negative results cannot be rationally
discounted by their probability: permanent harm extends infinitely and
is thus immeasurable for purposes of risk analysis. 19 Second, individu-
als may be risk averse with regard to sufficiently high losses, even
though the probability of occurrence is slight, for psychological reasons.
Full elimination of a hazard is often valued more highly than protec-
tion based on probability, even if their utility is the same."2 Explana-
tions for such risk-averse behavior range from historical 221 (past acci-
dents have sensitized us to the hazards of activities previously
218 Analysts have suggested a weighting factor to accommodate the greater impact
of x lives lost at one time compared to the impact of one life lost in each of x separate
incidents. See Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 197, at 208.
219 See W. RowE, supra note 204, at 132.
220 [A] protective action which reduces the probability of a harm from 1
percent to zero, say, will be valued more highly than an action that
reduces the probability of the same harm from 2 percent to 1 percent.
Indeed, probabilistic insurance, which reduces the probability of loss by
half, is judged to be worth less than half the price of regular insurance
that eliminates the risk altogether.
Twersky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
Sci. 453 (1981).
In economic behavior, hedging, cost-plus contracts, and insurance illustrate behav-
ior which is inconsistent with risk-neutrality. Such risk-averse behavior leads to higher
precautionary burdens on individuals and social resources than would be suggested by a
straightforward application of a risk-benefit calculus. "The fact is, most people are
willing to pay excessive amounts of money to get rid of vagueness. Perhaps this is
because they don't know how to cope with it rationally or purposively or perhaps the
explanation is more purely emotional, the specific reasons are immaterial." H. RAIFFA,
DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY
159 (1968).
221 See generally W. ROWE, supra note 204, at 263-64 (describing the increased
awareness of the side effects and potential irreversible harm of new technological sys-
tems, such as liquified natural gas tankers and nuclear power plants).
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unsuspected), biological 222 (there may be an evolutionary advantage to
special concern about catastrophic accidents), and cultural (the public
perception of risk is a collective construct, produced by the selective
focus of our social organizations on certain dangers).223 Whatever the
causal explanation, individual risk-aversion to catastrophic results, be-
yond what a utility analysis would predict, is part of the mental frame
of individuals.
3. The Value of a Judicial Response
Development of a concept of nuisance entitlements based upon a
consequence-oriented risk assessment can thus be justified by reference
to the traditional response of courts to social risks and the problems
potential catastrophe poses for risk analysis-the expanded impact of
catastrophic events, the difficulty of discounting irreversible catastro-
phes, and the psychological fact that people are risk averse with regard
to catastrophic losses. The concept of dread, as developed in the older
nuisance cases and by Nozick, captures some of the underpinnings of
this consequence-oriented viewpoint. A pattern of consequence-oriented
regulation has emerged in recent federal legislation, 224 and in judicial
review of this legislation. Statutes governing public suits for abatement
of nuisances typically authorize injunctive relief upon a showing of
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment, '2 25 a standard which has been liberally cohstrued.2  The focus
222 See Mole, Accepting Risks for Other People, 69 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY OF MEDICINE 107, 109 (1976) ("special concern about a simultaneously oc-
curing group of casualties may possibly be determined not only by social conventions
but also by a basic human characteristic with evolutionary advantages and therefore not
eradicable by reason and information"). For a discussion of the impact of evolutionary
behavior on law, see Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEG.
STUD. 649 (1980).
23 M. DouGLAs & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 215, at 186.
224 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. IV 1980); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1111979); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 300f-j (Supp. IV 1980); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (1976); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
225 E.g., Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(b)(1); see also Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976), which further autho-
rizes the EPA administrator to seek a federal injunction restraining improper "han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal" of hazardous wastes. Id. § 6973.
225 See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc),
in which the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's standard of "endangering the
health or welfare of persons," 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (g)(1) (1976) was held to include po-
tential as well as actual harm.
In assessing probabilities in this case, it cannot be said that the probability
of harm is more likely than not. Moreover the level of probability does not
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has been on the severity of the hazard rather than the probability of
harm, in areas of scientific uncertainty and potentially devastating con-
sequences.227 Nuisance law, as a common law source of entitlements for
private parties, can be redirected to adopt this approach. Judicial deci-
sionmaking requires a reasoning process that gives weight to appropri-
ate factors. If the judicial framework is oriented toward a probability-
weighted calculus, ignoring high gravity results if the probabilities seem
low enough,22 the consequences, even if potentially catastrophic, will
be experienced as trivial, to be ignored by a "rational" decisionmaker.
But if the judicial framework for nuisance law is oriented toward con-
sequences, considering catastrophic impacts as a central concern, then
public actions derived from private entitlements will be brought into
line with modern legislation and contemporary concerns about potential
irreversible catastrophe.
Nuisance law can supply us with a judicial framework which pro-
vides a broader perspective on risks, drawing on the ability of a judicial
decision, by elaborating on a norm or right, to educate us about the
social impact of an activity. Judicial intervention may change our hab-
its of thought in the face of an uncertain hazard by enhancing the
imaginability of the consequences, and illustrating the sequence of steps
readily convert into a prediction of consequences .... The best that can
be said is that the existence of this asbestos contaminant in air and water
gives rise to a reasonable medical concern for the public health. The pub-
lic's exposure to asbestos fibers in air and water creates some health risk.
514 F.2d at 520. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc)
("endanger means something less than actual harm"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Envt'l Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
("a hazard may be 'imminent' even if its impact will not be apparent for many years").
"I In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976), the court considered the public health hazards of leaded gasoline:
"[T]he public health may properly be found endangered both by a lesser risk of a
greater harm and by a greater risk of a lesser harm. Danger depends upon the relation
between the risk and harm presented by each case." 541 F.2d at 18 (footnotes omitted).
In United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980), the
government sought an injunction ordering a chemical corporation to commence abate-
ment proceedings against dioxin: "While there may be a low probability of harm from
dioxin as defendants contend, there is a serious and dire risk from exposure to dioxin
should the hypothesis advanced by the plaintiffs prove to be valid." 489 F. Supp. at
885. The court quoted Judge Skelly Wright's dissent in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, No. 73-
2205, slip op. at 11, (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd, 541 F.2d
I (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976): "'[A risk may be assessed]
from suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from
trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, or from probative
preliminary data not yet certifiable as "fact."' " 489 F. Supp. at 885.
228 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations are probability-oriented,
going so far as to preclude consideration of catastrophic accidents in the course of li-
censing proceedings. See Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licens-
ing: The Great Delusion, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 514-15 (1974).
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that might cause the actualization of the consequences. The discussion
of possible risks, their likelihood, and alternative pathways open up the
technology to a range of considerations that might not otherwise have
been apparent.
IV. PUBLIC ACTION AND PRIVATE LAW
A litigation model based upon the re-emergence of the equitable
powers of the judiciary may have advantages in coping with risks in-
volving catastrophic consequences. The model is patterned after the
"public law" litigation model, in which the courts have entered the
spotlight "as part of a gathering effort to control the bureaucracies of a
complex modern society."229 In these cases the judge, exercising equit-
able powers, fashions an ongoing decree at the end of a complex litiga-
tion process, including elements of negotiation and mediation, among a
range of affected parties. The procedural arsenal used by judges in
these cases has long been available. The courts are seeking to protect
new entitlements through an expanded use of traditional equitable
powers and an enlarged concept of judicial oversight. 30
A. The Public Action Model
A judicial risk-assessment suit, brought to initiate inquiry into the
hazards of a scientific or technological activity, would constitute a
"public action." This term, which is roughly synonomous with "public
law litigation"2 ' and "complex enforcement,"232 describes a wide
range of suits that share the characteristic of affecting a large number
of persons through the resolution of a significant issue of public pol-
icy.2" The observations of Abram Chayes on this area of litigation il-
lustrate the appropriateness of a public action for the resolution of dis-
putes over scientific research:
The interest of absentees . . . becomes more pressing as so-
119 Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 60 (1982).
230 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extra-ordinary in Institu-
tional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
231 Cogan, Some Thoughts on the Meaning of "Public Action" and the Concerns
of Public Action Adjudication, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 215, 216 (1980).
2'2 See Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94
HARV. L. REv. 626, 626 n.1 (1981).
23 For discussions of the reasons why such suits should be and have been permit-
ted despite the apparent absence of traditional standing prerequisites, see J. VINING,
supra note 161, and Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). See also Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 759 (1971).
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cial and economic activity is increasingly organized through
large aggregates of people. An order nominally addressed to
an individual litigant-the labor injunction is an early exam-
ple-has obvious and visible impact on persons not individu-
ally before the court. . . .In cases of this kind, the funda-
mental concept of litigation as a mechanism for private
dispute settlement is no longer viable. The argument is about
whether or how a government policy or program shall be
carried out.
23 4
The common law of public and private nuisance shares many
characteristics with the modem public action. Unlike damage actions,
which involve reconstruction of a past set of events, nuisance actions,
like public actions, are brought to influence future events.2 5 The relief
afforded must protect the rights of interested parties who may not be
before the court.2 36 The fact-finding function of the judge in both nui-
sance and public actions differs from the traditional damage model,
since it is prospective, requiring assessment of alternative plans to cor-
rect the problem. The process looks more and more "legislative" as the
traditional adversarial structure breaks down. The judge accumulates
responsibility for factfinding, as he "is placed in an active role in shap-
ing, organizing and facilitating the litigation.
'237
As is the case with modern public actions, a risk-assessment action
based on nuisance would entail a negotiation process culminating in a
decree. The negotiation process mitigates objections based on the intru-
siveness of complex decrees. 33 Where judges have felt a need to gener-
' Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1294 (1976): See also Chayes, supra note 229, at 56, in which Chayes updates
his conception of public law litigation:
I began this essay by posing the question whether public law litigation,
seemingly an expression of a liberal and reformist ideology in the legal
system, would be able to withstand prolonged confrontation with a Su-
preme Court whose dominant tenor was neither liberal nor reformist. I
submit that the foregoing reconnaissance, limited and fragmentary as it is,
provides considerable evidence that the attributes of public law litigation
are strongly resistant to conscious efforts at reversal.
211 See Chayes, supra note 234, at 1293.
238 See id. at 1292.
37 See id. at 1297; see also K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3
(1978) (distinguishing between "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts).
238 See Chayes, supra note 234, at 1299. For a favorable discussion of decision-
making through negotiation and adjudication, see Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637,
654 (1976). See also Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv.
353, 371 (1978) (defining certain areas of human association in which adjudication is
an inappropriate form of social ordering).
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ate information and develop proposals, they have often appointed mas-
ters, amici, panels, and advisory committees. 39 The breadth of interests
represented raises questions about the adequacy of the representation
afforded by a single plaintiff. The potential of the judicial system to
respond to interests that may not be adequately represented in a legisla-
tive setting or in the context of agency action is substantial. In any
proceeding with broad public impact, whether judicial or administra-
tive, we do not have a reliable way to identify the affected interests.
However, the courts may be in a better position than the legislature to
respond to those interests. The judge is insulated from the risk of being
"captured." '24 He can require notification and draw in outside view-
points. He also has the power to appoint a guardian ad litem for un-
represented interests, or an ombudsman. 4"
The flexibility of injunctive relief in public actions makes it a par-
ticularly appropriate means of controlling hazardous activities before
the full extent of the risk is fully known. An injunction seeks to prevent
a future wrong, conditioned on a showing that there is a probability (of
some indeterminate magnitude) of that future wrong's occurrence. It
has traditionally been seen as a supplement to the compensatory sys-
tem, invoked only where damages are for various reasons unsatisfac-
tory. The threat of a permanent injunction compels bargaining and fa-
cilitates it. Such an injunction may be a preferred remedy where no
damage has occurred, but a high-risk activity is being conducted, thus
inducing in plaintiffs a dread of harm. The preventative injunction
overlaps both the regulatory and the structural injunction, as the older
injunction cases illustrate. Thus the bargaining process may involve
mediation by the judge and in some instances an ongoing regulatory
decree.2 42 The ongoing decree has been common in nuisance cases
where an absolute injunction or a flat denial is inadequate. In some
21, See Chayes, supra note 234, at 1301 and cases cited at 1301 n.87.
240 Id. at 1310. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-88 (1975).
241 Parties who are potentially affected may be fearful of judicial procedures or
may lack the resources necessary to pursue their interests. Notions of due process may
therefore require flexibility in "looking beyond the traditional adversary model for pro-
cedures to restrain arbitrary governmental action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrru-
TIONAL LAW, § 10-19 (1978).
242 See Chayes, supra note 234 at 1292-94. Decrees that impose conditions upon
the continuation of an activity can be found in a number of nuisance cases. See, e.g.,
Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963) (aluminum re-
duction plant required, inter alia, to install cell hoods preventing excessive emission of
flourine); Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914) (gen-
eral injunction not to commit nuisance, with caveat that defendant could install devices
to block escape of dust); Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 4 (1910)
(imposing conditions on operation of noisy iron works).
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such cases, the court has directed the defendant to experiment with
means of reducing the hazard, providing for periodic reports back to the
court or a special master.2' 3
B. The Strengths of the Public Action Nuisance Model
Critics have called nuisance doctrine anachronistic," designed as
a means of resolving neighborly disputes about trivial annoyances,
rather than for the uses which modern advocates propose. Is the at-
tempt to build upon nuisance law simply a lawyer's trick, an appropri-
ation of a distinct concept without acknowledging a change in mean-
ing?2 45 Nuisance law has a clear substrata of caselaw which considered
dread of catastrophic results a proper basis for injunctive relief. By
eliminating the more modem process of balancing the harm against the
utility of an activity at the threshold level of definition, we can return
nuisance law to its historical beginnings as a device for technology con-
trol. However, it is not doctrine which troubles modern critics. Argu-
ments against such a nuisance action center on the capacity of the judi-
ciary. Relative institutional ability provides the focal point for such
criticism, which attempts to lay down theoretical limitations on the
ability of courts to deal with complex modem hazards.
Critics make the following arguments:
(1) episodic lawsuits cannot provide for broad policy consid-
erations, as can a national regulatory body, nor can they fit
an individual case into an integrated plan;
246
(2) lawsuits are usually brought too late, because of the ne-
cessity of proving damage as a basis for recovery, to prevent
problems of environmental degradation or damage to public
health from the release of such harmful instrumentalities as
143 For a series of cases in which the court in effect set emission standards in
advance of the existence of regulatory agencies like the EPA, see Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); 237 U.S. 474 (1915); 240 U.S. 650 (1916) (abating
nuisance from smelting of copper, a limited injunction was issued, based upon the re-
ports of a court-appointed inspector).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 941 comment e (1977), acknowledges
that "much can often be accomplished by an order requiring experiments to be con-
ducted under neutral scientific supervision .... In appropriate cases, experiments
should be undertaken before an injunction against nuisance or stream pollution is de-
nied on the ground of relative hardship or of countervailing public interest."
244 See, e.g., Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 349, 356.
'" See Posner, Lawyers as Philosophers: Ackerman and Others, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 231, 249.





(3) the costs of judicial supervision are excessive,"4" and in
the area of complex technological hazards, supervision may
be beyond the sophistication of the courts; 49
(4) prospective lawsuits for relief, even if adequate doctrinal
underpinnings were available, are too dependent upon the
willingness and financial ability of private groups to sue,
leading to spotty, incomplete regulation.
The public action nuisance model can withstand the criticisms di-
rected at reform of nuisance doctrine as a means of supplanting public
regulation. Where the feared activity, such as scientific research in new
areas, is carried out intentionally in an environment of social optimism
toward research and its fruits, the tort process, initiated and conducted
by the interested injured party, is a public action, substituting for gov-
ernment regulation. It is a form of institutional skepticism, a check on
the momentum of activities whose effects are not yet clearly apparent.
A court is the ideal institution to change incrementally to deal with
putative hazard, obviating the necessity for a new social mechanism,
while providing a rich tradition suited for the problem.
First, a court may have advantages in gathering and assessing in-
formation. 50 Parties will have a strong incentive to present informa-
tion, and if the party structure is adequate, much information should be
produced. This can be subjected not only to adversarial review, but also
to the review of experts appointed by the judge to evaluate complex
scientific issues.251 It has been argued that in certain contexts the par-
ties to litigation may lack a real interest in helping the court under-
27 See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 584, 589-90 (1981).
248 See generally D. Hoaowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
24 See Bereano, Courts as Institutions for Assessing Technology (paper presented
at 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Atomic Scientists) quoted in
D. Hoaowrrz, supra note 248, at 39 (courts are "poorly equipped to perform early
warning functions since there are not motivated parties to clearly present the issue"
before harm occurs); see also Yellin, supra note 4 (proposing review board composed of
masters trained in law and science).
250 See Chayes, supra note 234, at 1308; Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221,
240-41, 248-49 (1973). The adversary model has often been seen as an effective frame-
work for resolving complex issues, a process in which such complexities are "resolved
in the crucible of debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientific and
technological viewpoints." Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (challenge to EPA ruling on automobile emis-
sions). See also Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187
(1975).
251 See Chayes, supra note 234 at 1308.
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stand the technical and scientific complexities of an issue, or that cer-
tain information will not be developed for tactical or other reasons.252
In the nuclear energy context, it has been argued that the benefits of
the adversary process in reviewing agency decisionmaking has come at
the cost of detracting from the substantive quality of the decisions, be-
cause of the complex hybrid technological-legal questions posed.2 3 The
answer is to amend the adversary model, as the public action cases
demonstrate, 2 "4 to enhance sources of information and judgment, espe-
cially if the interests of the parties are not sufficient to generate all of
the relevant information.
The argument that the litigation process can neither improve the
scientific underpinnings nor the reasoning process involved in complex
agency regulation of technological risks must also be dealt with at the
"first look" level. For if a court lacks as a fundamental characteristic
the ability to generate and evaluate complex scientific evidence, then the
deficiency will pervade its evaluations both at the level of agency review
and at the level of "first look" decisionmaking in private or public liti-
gation. What evidence is there of such judicial shortcomings? The pri-
mary argument is based upon the history and nature of the adversary
system. In the words of one critic:
stripped of its modern instrumental trappings, the adver-
sarial engine sets the stage for explicit justice, and on that
stage factual findings are mainly made by exploring human
sense perceptions. Complex environmental findings do not
lend themselves to such direct observation, and adversarial
devices do not improve their reliability or evidentiary
value.2 55
The adversarial devices-cross-examination of witnesses,258 evi-
dentiary rules which focus on testimonial infirmities, and procedural
rules for the discovery of information-from this perspective, are aimed
primarily at evaluating witness perception of phenomena and events
252 See Yellin, supra note 4, at 508, 529-31 & 552-53 (1981).
253 Id. at 508.
2" See supra notes 202-40 and accompanying text.
25 Yellin, supra note 4, at 549. Yellin has made this point in an earlier article.
See Yellin, Judicial Review and Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental
Catastrophe, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 969, 981 (1977).
2M See FED. R. EvID. 611. Wigmore may have overstated the case in describing
cross-examination as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth," but courts have consistently acknowledged its importance and its constitutional
underpinnings. See United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1976) ("the right
of cross-examination is of constitutional dimension and may not be denied").
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accessible to the unassisted senses."'7 This takes too narrow a view of
the evidentiary materials that have traditionally been admissible in liti-
gation, ignoring the need to reconstruct complex past events by refer-
ence to analogy, past history, and statistical patterns.25 In evaluating
past events, for example, we have drawn upon scientific testing as an
aid to reconstructing events where eyewitnesses are lacking. 5 9 The
common law nuisance and trespass cases dealt with harms normally
detectable by the unaided senses because those were the only harms
recognized prior to the development of more sophisticated means of en-
hancing our senses. But this suggests the existence of a need for in-
creased sophistication on the part of both judges and lawyers to handle
the newer technoldgies of detection and analysis, rather than an inher-
ent limitation of the judiciary.
Cross-examination can aid in assessing expert judgments. It can
serve as a probe of forecasts and general conclusions underlying future
planning issues, just as effectively as it serves to evaluate past events.
260
Underlying biases, unstated assumptions, and methodological shortcom-
ings can be easily revealed by an effective cross-examination.
Moreover, a legal complaint phrases a grievance in a way that a
defendant cannot ignore.2" 1 The defendant must respond at each stage
or risk penalties such as dismissal or even contempt citation. Because a
court must respond to a complaint, litigation is more potent than either
an agency or a legislature in following through on grievances.
A judicial first-look mechanism can send a message to government
decisionmakers, particularly Congress, when the risks under considera-
tion are unrecognized, unregulated or underregulated. Judicial ability
to affect government action, either at the first or second look level, re-
quires an ability to consider technical issues systematically, in order to
convey their analyses and conclusions to professionals in the govern-
257 The claim is that the common law causes of action, such as trespass and nui-
sance, were designed to deal with harmful effects that may be detected by "the "unas-
sisted senses," see Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906), rather than with the
subtle injuries caused by microorganisms, chemicals and radiation.
28 The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, provide for a limited use of char-
acter evidence to prove conduct, provide for proof of character, and permit evidence of
habit to prove conduct on a particular occasion. FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 406. Courts in
older cases have relied on recurring patterns to establish causation. See, e.g., Stubbs v.
City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919) (statistical evidence adduced to
establish causation between contaminated water supplies and typhoid fever infections).
219 See generally MOENSSONS & INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES (2d ed. 1978).
260 Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485,
521-22 (1970).
261 See Diver, supra note 242, at 66.
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ment and in agencies, transmitting a sense of the heft of the case and
the weight of opposing arguments.262 Where Congress has considered
regulating in an area of scientific controversy, a judicial decision and a
decree incorporating various structural constraints would convey-more
sharply than a string of witnesses in a Congressional hearing-the ur-
gency of a problem, a reasoned analysis of the risks, and the outlines of
a framework for further regulation. Judges are trained in the analysis
of problems, with the ability to suspend judgment initially until the
parties have hammered out areas of disagreement and agreement.2683
They are free of political pressures, unlike Congress and federal agen-
cies, and thus better able to take a position and mandate changes. In
public actions involving the administration of institutions such as school
systems and prisons, it may be that the task of ongoing management
strains the limits of judicial management to its utmost, impairing in
some cases the day-to-day operation of the system.2 However, the as-
sessment of new hazards is a more familiar task, albeit one complicated
by scientific uncertainty. Courts have traditionally evaluated alternative
means of reducing risks or provided incentives for the parties to do so.
Finally, a high degree of participation by affected parties can be
achieved through the appointment of amici and other representatives of
groups who would not otherwise be heard in the setting of agency
rulemaking or Congressional legislation. 6 5
The decentralized character of litigation has drawbacks as well as
262 See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 509, 525, 536 (1974); see also Bazelon, Implementing the Right to
Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742, 749 (1969) ("courts fulfill a necessary function
when the drama and publicity attending a concrete case provide the illumination of
dark recesses which is essential if society and its legislatures are to make informed
judgments").
263 See Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 498
(1977).
2" See the extended critique in D. HORowrrz, supra note 248, at 264,
describing:
the impotence of the courts to supervise the implementation of their de-
crees, their impatience with protracted litigation, and their limited ability
to monitor the consequences of their action. Called upon increasingly to
perform administrative functions because they are not burdened with ad-
ministrative rigidities, the courts are also not blessed with administrative
capabilities.
For an interesting first-person account, see Wood, Managing a School System
Under Court Order, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 22, col. 3: "What was most frus-
trating to an administrator. . . was that the logic of court procedures makes it exceed-
ingly difficult for me and my colleagues to make orderly, timely or rational manage-
ment decisions."
265 Stewart has described the expansion of the right of intervention both in agency




advantages, however. While bargaining may be facilitated, a would-be
victim must be found, willing to undertake the litigation, as well as a
lawyer who can be assured payment. This suggests the need for some
sort of public fund to compensate attorneys for public law litigation
where no damages are alleged and no statute invoked, and where the
end result of litigation may not be a win-or-lose decision, but rather an
ongoing decree or simply a complete factual record available for public
scrutiny and information.""'
C. The Nuisance Action Revived: The "First Look Doctrine"
Nuisance law can be provided with a more flexible framework for
resolving disputes in areas of scientific uncertainty. Courts have for too
long merged the issues of the existence of nuisance with the question of
the remedy sought, denying the existence of a nuisance when the pro-
hibitory injunction seemed too harsh a remedy. Thus, a cost-benefit cal-
culation is usually made at the level of determining whether a nuisance
exists, balancing conflicting interests and the usefulness of the risky ac-
tivity. Even if a nuisance is found, the court will again balance interests
on the issue of granting the injunction against the nuisance.267 This
process, which leads to the dismissal of actions against otherwise action-
able nuisances because of judicial reluctance to grant permanent injunc-
tions, fails to take into account the very flexibility inherent in the equi-
table powers of the judiciary. The proposed solution is a three step
analysis, 2s8 closer to that which originally characterized nuisance litiga-
tion: first, a judicial determination of the substantive issue of the exis-
tence of a nuisance; second, the generation of information about the
hazards and their alleviations, through allocation of the burdens of
proof to those parties best equipped to produce information; third, judi-
cial monitoring to aid the parties in negotiating a decree.
1. The Prima Facie Case
The prima facie case for a hazardous activity requires evidence of
'" See Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants,
96 H, v. L. REv. 677, 677 & n.3 (1983), for a list of federal environmental statutes
authorizing fee awards whenever the court finds such an award "appropriate."
267 See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 941, comment c (1977).
268 1 am indebted to Joel Yellin, whose article, supra note 255, oriented my think-
ing in the directions which I have developed. His discussion, particularly at 985-88,
contains a number of suggestions which I have expanded and fleshed out. See also
Rabin, Nuisance Law; Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REv. 1299,
1300 (1977) (describing an analogous, two-step approach).
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endangerment.269 Endangerment details an assertion of possible harm
which at a minimum does not violate any known scientific principle,
which cannot be disproved on the basis of current scientific knowledge,
and which cannot be eliminated on the basis of current information.
Plaintiff must establish that a hazard exists, the consequences of which
are sufficiently severe to qualify as catastrophic. 70 The plaintiff's spe-
cial damages would be the dread which is the logical effect of a hazard-
ous activity whose effects cannot currently be prevented. A judicial de-
cision would thus include evaluation of the physical possibility of the
feared outcomes, based on prior historical experience, experimentation,
or knowledge of the physical laws involved,271 and the kind of harm to
public health or the environment which will result if the feared harm
materializes. The prima facie case establishes the plaintiff's right not
necessarily to injunctive relief, but to more information. 2
2. The Generation of Information and Reduction of Uncertainty
The finding of a prima facie nuisance would effect a judicial pre-
sumption that the risky activity needs better controls than we trust at
present either self-regulation by those involved, or the workings of the
market, to provide. Technology assessment is the goal of step two,
which is interconnected with and proceeds simultaneously with the ne-
gotiation process of step three. New information about the nature of the
hazard and the probabilities of its occurrence is sought, as the parties
further identify and estimate the risks. The burden of producing evi-
dence is on that party in the best position either to produce it or to
generate new information through testing and other means. Such infor-
mation would include: an account of the reliability of available infor-
mation; possible alternatives to the proposed activity;217 the social con-
269 See supra note 224 for statutory references to "endangerment".
270 See Yellin, supra note 255, at 987-88, for a discussion of such an approach to
nuclear power regulation.
171 See, e.g., Bethe, Ultimate Catastrophe?, BULL. ATOM. Sci., June, 1976, at 36
(discussing impossibility of ignition of ocean or atmosphere by nuclear explosion).
222 This step must take note of the limitations of relying on decentralized, individ-
ual-initiated litigation. First, one needs information that risks are being created, since
most hazards of scientific research are not visible to the senses and are therefore specu-
lative. The willingness of individual scientists to come forward with concerns, coupled
with legal protection for whistle-blowers against retribution by employers, may be the
only way to provide the initial information. Certainly the actions of Paul Berg and
others in addressing the hazards of recombinant DNA research indicates potential for
such an early warning system. The idea of a relationship between the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment and academic scientists, whereby various lines of research are ana-
lyzed on a contract basis, has potential as well.
217 See Noll & Thomas, The Economic Implications of Regulation by Expertise:
The Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT
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text of the activity-the relative ability of the parties to the immediate
lawsuit to bargain and the need to join other affected interests; and the
limits that can be set on the feared outcome, based upon current knowl-
edge, such as experience in dealing with epidemics through public
health controls.217
3. The Negotiated Decree
The third step develops the remedy, in a process by which the
judge draws upon his equitable powers. A finding of a prima facie nui-
sance having been made, the parties can now negotiate with the help of
the judge, as they should have in the first place. Ventilation of the is-
sues occurs in an environment in which the presumption is against con-
tinuation of the activity in its present form. A nuisance has been found,
as a threshold matter-an activity creating a high-consequence risk, one
whose probabilities of actualization are unknown, generating dread in
those who are either in proximity to the activity or within the casual
line of sight of the dreaded harm. The remedy stage of the revised nui-
sance model for complex hazards is a form of judicial rulemaking by
negotiation. 5 Several advantages accrue from the flexible nature of the
remedy stage. In devising safeguards based upon information produced,
a complex set of polycentric concerns are involved, 76 which it is un-
likely that a traditional adversary setting could unravel. The act of
bringing multiple parties together in a negotiation model provides for
an interaction of concerns. Negotiation, in the setting in which the par-
ties are forced together (by a preliminary judicial acknowledgement, in
stage one, that the activity is a nuisance) fosters a pragmatic search for
options. The posturing which the adversary system sometimes encour-
ages within the bipolar framework is likely to break down here in a
common search for solutions.
Finally, a final decree based upon the negotiation will be more
acceptable to the parties, since the negotiation context encourages the
working out of a compromise settlement, unlike the adversary setting, a
zero-sum game with only one right answer.
DNA 262 (1977).
27' Proponents of recombinant DNA research argue that even if an organism pro-
duced as a result of the technology escaped, existing public health measures would be
adequate to deal with resultant epidemics and other health problems. See FINAL EIS,
supra note 9, at 80 (excerpt from letter by Roy Curtiss to Donald Fredrickson).
'75 See generally Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to
Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1871 (1981).
276 See id. at 1876.
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V. CONCLUSION
The expansion of private law remedies to deal with the hazards of
scientific research offers an opportunity to utilize an existing institution
with substantial powers, in lieu of a new bureaucracy which will not
achieve the goal of technology assessment. Scientists, like other profes-
sionals, can no longer lay claim to the argument that their special
knowledge deserves complete autonomy. Self-regulation, in science as in
the medical and legal professions, has proved insufficient. A new judi-
cial perspective on hazards, weighing consequence over probability and
utilizing flexible decrees drawn from a rich tradition of equity jurispru-
dence, provides a needed mechanism for confronting new hazards and
gaining control over them at an early stage in their development.
A tort suit is thus a vehicle for asserting a sense of dread in the
face of uncertainty and in the absence of existing public administrative
regulation. It provides an existing mechanism for asserting a risk-averse
approach to new scientific and technological activities. Where the ex-
pected end-product and risks are both uncertain and diffuse, but the
consequences may affect a whole way of life, a burden of justifying the
activity and its risks can be put on those who seek to undertake that
activity. The blending of the risk-averse strain of nuisance law and the
equitable powers of the judiciary may provide a potent tool of technol-
ogy assessment of new activities. The thesis of this Article is that com-
mon law nuisance entitlements can be redefined to cope with the risks
of modern science and technology, then coupled with the use of com-
plex injunctive decrees to provide a prophylactic means of governing
hazard. Such a private right of action is an open, nonbureaucratic
means of asserting an important public value and gaining some mea-
sure of enforcement over activities occurring in a regulatory vacuum.
The courtroom may also serve as a stage for dramatizing the sense of
dread attendant upon many modern risk-creating activities, putting
pressure upon legislatures to fill the vacuum. The courts have limits,
and it is undoubtedly correct that they "apprehend and implement only
a few of the various possible conceptions of institutional purpose.
27 7
However, private lawsuits also have compensating advantages where
the alternative institutions are weak or lacking. In a time of deregula-
tion, when the Supreme Court has restricted the possibility of deriving
private rights to sue from federal legislation, the common law remains
a residual source of values upon which to base public actions. The best
long term solution may be a mix of public and private enforcement, but
27 Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1193, 1319 (1983).
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until such public regulation is available, private law can become public
action.
I
